Vanderbilt Political Review Winter 2014 | Page 26

INTERNATIONAL VANDERBILT POLITICAL REVIEW Reasons for optimism Analyzing concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear program by GREGORY BERNSTEIN ‘17 W hen Secretary of State John Kerry announced that Iran and the West had reached a nuclear agreement after weeks of tenuous, on-andoff negotiations in Geneva, Iran solidified its position as the foremost nation of interest for international diplomats and global nuclear experts. Despite how Pyongyang and Tehran dominated headlines in 2013, Islamabad also underwent new developments in its civilian and military nuclear programs. The three major stories concerning Pakistan’s nuclear programs focus on continued concerns about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear storage facilities, a possible nuclear arms deal between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and a deal between China and Pakistan to break ground on two new nuclear reactors. D Stockpile Safety espite official claims by Pakistani leaders that the nation’s nuclear stockpile is safe, the lack of international oversight and the refusal to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to visit certain nuclear sites leave cause for concern. As outlined by the Federation of American Scientists, concerns over Pakistan’s nuclear stockpiles fall into two categories. The first major concern is that a terrorist organization, such as al-Qaeda or the Haqqani network, could obtain fissile material for the creation of a dirty bomb or even nuclear warheads. Secondly, a lack of civilian oversight allows nuclear scientists or even the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency in Pakistan, to peddle nuclear information and technology to rogue states. The first concern stems from Pakistan’s high degree of political instability and terrorist activity. In August 2012, twelve members of the Tehreek-e-Taliban carried out an attack 26 at the Kamra Air Base, leaving two security officers dead and raising new questions about the military security at sites housing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Fortunately, the creation of the National Command Authority (NCA), which is overseen by a two-star general, was a major step forward for Pakistan. With over 20,000 personnel, the NCA is a well-staffed security outfit dedicated to the security of the country’s nuclear weapons. The Arms Control Association reports that Pakistan’s strict military control over their nuclear stockpiles and lack of transparent civilian oversight make it difficult for experts in the United States to gauge Pakistan’s nuclear security. Pakistan ostensibly committed itself to security, but reports of security blunders continue to surface. For instance, the Nuclear Threat Initiative details an incident in which military officers allegedly transported nuclear warheads and other equipment in unmarked vans as opposed to helicopters or secured military vehicles. The second area of concern deals with the lack of civilian oversight over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and is rooted in historical precedent. In 2003 it was revealed that Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist since the 1980s, provided the governments of North Korea, Iran, and Libya with designs for gas centrifuges developed during his years working for the URENCO group (a developer of nuclear technology based in the United Kingdom) and Khan Research Laboratories. The Congressional Research Service reports that John Negroponte, the former Director of National Intelligence, testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Pakistani proliferation ended with the 2004 and 2005 disruption and dismantlement of the A.Q. Khan network. In 2011 the Department of State confirmed that Pakistan “is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials.” While these statements reflect the official stance of the State Department, many international observers remain unconvinced that the proliferation networks established by A.Q. Khan have been entirely dismantled. The Pakistani government’s decision to release A.Q. Khan from house arrest coupled with their refusal to turn over certain documents bolster these suspicions. The Saudi Arabia Question W hile many of the security concerns raised by non-proliferation experts are legitimate, there is one longstanding myth which remains despite broad rejection from most experts with first-hand knowledge of Pakistan’s nuclear program: that Pakistan stands ready to ship nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia should it request them, a scenario that might occur if Iran were to develop a launchable nuclear weapon. Despite little evidence that the PakistaniSaudi nuclear relationship could result in Saudi Arabia requesting and receiving nuclear weapons from Pakistan, top-level figures within the Obama administration have argued that such a scenario is plausible, if not likely. In November of 2013, the BBC reported that Dennis Ross, the former Special Advisor for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, and Gary Samore, President Obama’s counter-proliferation advisor, both believe that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have an implicit agreement for the Saudis to access Pakistani nuclear warheads in exigent circumstances. These beliefs are based on Saudi Arabia’s long history of illicit weapons purchases -- in the 1980s, for example,