INTERNATIONAL
VANDERBILT POLITICAL REVIEW
Reasons for optimism
Analyzing concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear program
by GREGORY BERNSTEIN ‘17
W
hen Secretary of State John
Kerry announced that Iran and
the West had reached a nuclear
agreement after weeks of tenuous, on-andoff negotiations in Geneva, Iran solidified its
position as the foremost nation of interest for
international diplomats and global nuclear
experts. Despite how Pyongyang and Tehran dominated headlines in 2013, Islamabad
also underwent new developments in its civilian and military nuclear programs. The
three major stories concerning Pakistan’s
nuclear programs focus on continued concerns about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear
storage facilities, a possible nuclear arms
deal between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia,
and a deal between China and Pakistan to
break ground on two new nuclear reactors.
D
Stockpile Safety
espite official claims by Pakistani
leaders that the nation’s nuclear
stockpile is safe, the lack of international oversight and the refusal to allow International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) inspectors to visit certain nuclear
sites leave cause for concern. As outlined
by the Federation of American Scientists,
concerns over Pakistan’s nuclear stockpiles
fall into two categories. The first major concern is that a terrorist organization, such as
al-Qaeda or the Haqqani network, could obtain fissile material for the creation of a dirty
bomb or even nuclear warheads. Secondly,
a lack of civilian oversight allows nuclear
scientists or even the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency in Pakistan, to peddle nuclear
information and technology to rogue states.
The first concern stems from Pakistan’s
high degree of political instability and terrorist activity. In August 2012, twelve members
of the Tehreek-e-Taliban carried out an attack
26
at the Kamra Air Base, leaving two security officers dead and raising new questions
about the military security at sites housing
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Fortunately, the
creation of the National Command Authority (NCA), which is overseen by a two-star
general, was a major step forward for Pakistan. With over 20,000 personnel, the NCA
is a well-staffed security outfit dedicated to
the security of the country’s nuclear weapons. The Arms Control Association reports
that Pakistan’s strict military control over
their nuclear stockpiles and lack of transparent civilian oversight make it difficult for
experts in the United States to gauge Pakistan’s nuclear security. Pakistan ostensibly
committed itself to security, but reports of
security blunders continue to surface. For
instance, the Nuclear Threat Initiative details
an incident in which military officers allegedly transported nuclear warheads and other
equipment in unmarked vans as opposed
to helicopters or secured military vehicles.
The second area of concern deals with
the lack of civilian oversight over Pakistan’s
nuclear arsenal and is rooted in historical
precedent. In 2003 it was revealed that Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist since the 1980s, provided the governments of North Korea, Iran, and Libya with
designs for gas centrifuges developed during
his years working for the URENCO group
(a developer of nuclear technology based in
the United Kingdom) and Khan Research
Laboratories. The Congressional Research
Service reports that John Negroponte, the
former Director of National Intelligence,
testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Pakistani proliferation ended with the 2004 and 2005 disruption and dismantlement of the A.Q. Khan
network. In 2011 the Department of State
confirmed that Pakistan “is continuing to
cooperate with the United States in efforts
to dismantle supplier networks relating to
the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related
materials.” While these statements reflect
the official stance of the State Department,
many international observers remain unconvinced that the proliferation networks
established by A.Q. Khan have been entirely
dismantled. The Pakistani government’s decision to release A.Q. Khan from house arrest coupled with their refusal to turn over
certain documents bolster these suspicions.
The Saudi Arabia Question
W
hile many of the security concerns raised by non-proliferation experts are legitimate,
there is one longstanding myth which remains despite broad rejection from most
experts with first-hand knowledge of
Pakistan’s nuclear program: that Pakistan stands ready to ship nuclear weapons
to Saudi Arabia should it request them,
a scenario that might occur if Iran were
to develop a launchable nuclear weapon.
Despite little evidence that the PakistaniSaudi nuclear relationship could result in
Saudi Arabia requesting and receiving nuclear weapons from Pakistan, top-level figures within the Obama administration have
argued that such a scenario is plausible, if
not likely. In November of 2013, the BBC
reported that Dennis Ross, the former Special Advisor for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, and Gary Samore, President
Obama’s counter-proliferation advisor, both
believe that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have
an implicit agreement for the Saudis to access Pakistani nuclear warheads in exigent
circumstances. These beliefs are based on
Saudi Arabia’s long history of illicit weapons purchases -- in the 1980s, for example,