MARCH 2014
baselines as the borders of EEZs. The jurisdiction of these islands—which experts
sometimes refer to as five, other times as
eight in an attempt to follow the UNCLOS
definition—then determines more than
19,800 square nautical miles of ocean.
Obviously, access to the estimated 100
billion barrels of oil and 200 trillion cubic
feet of gas located right beneath the islands
is hugely attractive to both of these energy-guzzling nations. However, there are
deeper emotional undercurrents that have
also prevented an amicable resolution in
the face of ambiguous international law.
Japan committed brutal atrocities against
China during World War II, and even earlier in the 1890s -- exactly when Japan annexed the islands in the first place. Many
Chinese citizens, especially those in older
generations, still despise Japan for its refusal to apologize for the aforementioned
crimes, and because of the Chinese Communist regime’s utilization of popular
anti-Japanese sentiment to distract from
domestic issues. Bashing China is similarly effective for the Japanese government; many feel that Japan’s military and
economic power warrant consideration as
a global superpower, and see China as an
impediment to achivement of such status.
Japanese politicians find supporting Japanese ownership of the Senkaku Islands to
be an easy and effective way to bolster
their percieved patrioism, as well. Indeed,
the domestic backlash that would be incurred by whichever government chooses
to compromise cannot be downplayed.
Both nations have publicly pledged to
peacefully resolve ownership claims, but
there have already been incidents that
suggest such a resolution to be unlikely.
In November 2004, a Chinese nuclearpowered submarine entered Japanese
waters near the islands, and the Japanese
Navy reacted by going on full alert for
only the second time since the end of the
World War II and threatening the submarine with destroyers and aircrafts. If tensions were to escalate into violence, the
international consequences could be devastating. In 1960, the U.S. signed a Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security with
INTERNATIONAL
Photo: Luke D. Johnson, U.S. Navy
Japan that pledges to defend all Japanese
territorie. With 50,000 soldiers currently stationed in Japan, the U.S. would be
hard-pressed not to intervene, although
factors like China’ share of the U.S. debt
might make unfavorable U.S.-Sino relations especially problematic. While no
direct attempts at drilling have begun by
either country, the press in both countries
has suggested an impatience to get started.
Throughout the conflict, Taiwan has
remained an ally of China’s. Without
unfettered access to the East China Sea,
mainland China’s only route to the high
seas is through the Taiwan Strait, half of
which is not controlled by the People’s
Republic of China, and which is heavily embroiled in another historical, deeprooted, and very controversial geopolitical disagreement that pits the PRC
against Taiwan and the United States.
UNCLOS has long relied on an expansive, one-size-fits-all approach to international law of the sea. EEZs, as well
as the continental shelf exception, are
uncontroversial in the Atlantic Ocean, for
example, but have afforded five to eight
uninhabited islands an absurd amount of
power. UNCLOS was created with the
Cold War in mind, at a time when Japan and China were not considered to
be huge geopolitical actors; as such, the
East China Sea was not considered in the
drafting of the law. While the timing and
vigor of this dispute is undoubtedly related to the islands’ hydrocarbon reserves,
it is the shaky language of UNCLOS that
allows both countries to use vague legal
terminology as a defense of sovereignty
and national identity in the first place
Neither country shows any sign of
backing down, or any willingness to defer
to an international third-party actor like
the U.N. or I.C.J. Perhaps they shouldn’t,
given how much of the dispute’s fuel
comes from international law itsel