Vanderbilt Political Review Winter 2014 | Page 25

MARCH 2014 baselines as the borders of EEZs. The jurisdiction of these islands—which experts sometimes refer to as five, other times as eight in an attempt to follow the UNCLOS definition—then determines more than 19,800 square nautical miles of ocean. Obviously, access to the estimated 100 billion barrels of oil and 200 trillion cubic feet of gas located right beneath the islands is hugely attractive to both of these energy-guzzling nations. However, there are deeper emotional undercurrents that have also prevented an amicable resolution in the face of ambiguous international law. Japan committed brutal atrocities against China during World War II, and even earlier in the 1890s -- exactly when Japan annexed the islands in the first place. Many Chinese citizens, especially those in older generations, still despise Japan for its refusal to apologize for the aforementioned crimes, and because of the Chinese Communist regime’s utilization of popular anti-Japanese sentiment to distract from domestic issues. Bashing China is similarly effective for the Japanese government; many feel that Japan’s military and economic power warrant consideration as a global superpower, and see China as an impediment to achivement of such status. Japanese politicians find supporting Japanese ownership of the Senkaku Islands to be an easy and effective way to bolster their percieved patrioism, as well. Indeed, the domestic backlash that would be incurred by whichever government chooses to compromise cannot be downplayed. Both nations have publicly pledged to peacefully resolve ownership claims, but there have already been incidents that suggest such a resolution to be unlikely. In November 2004, a Chinese nuclearpowered submarine entered Japanese waters near the islands, and the Japanese Navy reacted by going on full alert for only the second time since the end of the World War II and threatening the submarine with destroyers and aircrafts. If tensions were to escalate into violence, the international consequences could be devastating. In 1960, the U.S. signed a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with INTERNATIONAL Photo: Luke D. Johnson, U.S. Navy Japan that pledges to defend all Japanese territorie. With 50,000 soldiers currently stationed in Japan, the U.S. would be hard-pressed not to intervene, although factors like China’ share of the U.S. debt might make unfavorable U.S.-Sino relations especially problematic. While no direct attempts at drilling have begun by either country, the press in both countries has suggested an impatience to get started. Throughout the conflict, Taiwan has remained an ally of China’s. Without unfettered access to the East China Sea, mainland China’s only route to the high seas is through the Taiwan Strait, half of which is not controlled by the People’s Republic of China, and which is heavily embroiled in another historical, deeprooted, and very controversial geopolitical disagreement that pits the PRC against Taiwan and the United States. UNCLOS has long relied on an expansive, one-size-fits-all approach to international law of the sea. EEZs, as well as the continental shelf exception, are uncontroversial in the Atlantic Ocean, for example, but have afforded five to eight uninhabited islands an absurd amount of power. UNCLOS was created with the Cold War in mind, at a time when Japan and China were not considered to be huge geopolitical actors; as such, the East China Sea was not considered in the drafting of the law. While the timing and vigor of this dispute is undoubtedly related to the islands’ hydrocarbon reserves, it is the shaky language of UNCLOS that allows both countries to use vague legal terminology as a defense of sovereignty and national identity in the first place Neither country shows any sign of backing down, or any willingness to defer to an international third-party actor like the U.N. or I.C.J. Perhaps they shouldn’t, given how much of the dispute’s fuel comes from international law itsel