MARCH 2014
when the Saudi government purchased CSS2 ballistic missiles from China. The close relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia which is characterized by Saudi Arabia’s
financial support for Pakistani defense initiatives only further contributes to the plausibility of these concerns. Despite this, Mark
Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies explains some of his qualms
with the belief that Pakistan would ever
transfer nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia:
“I doubt that Pakistan is ready to send
nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s
reputation suffered greatly the last time they
assisted other countries with nuclear weapons technology (i.e., the sales by A.Q. Khan,
with some governmental support or at least
acquiescence, to North Korea, Iran and Libya). Pakistan knows that transferring nuclear
weapons to Saudi Arabia would also incur
huge diplomatic and reputational costs.”
David Albright, the director of the Institute
for Science and International Security, supports this statement and points out that if Saudi Arabia accepted Pakistani nuclear weapons, there would be costly and immediate
responses. One such response would be for
the United States to cancel its arms sales to
Saudi Arabia. With the United States currently selling Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates close to eleven billion dollars of
weaponry per year, it is unlikely Saudi Arabia
would turn to Pakistan for nuclear weapons.
Civil Nuclear Development
W
hile security analysts in Washington continue to worry about
the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons, Pakistan has shifted focus to a
number of ambitious civilian nuclear goals.
Last November, Pakistani Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif, along with the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan and agency heads from
the Pakistani Atomic Agency Commission, ceremonially broke ground on a new
nuclear reactor complex in Karachi. With
the Chinese ready to build the two new reactors, the endeavor marks the largest joint
nuclear program between the two nations.
Pakistani officials claim the deal was
designed to alleviate the rolling black-
INTERNATIONAL
outs affecting large cities like Karachi and
Hyderabad. Prime Minister Sharif, who
campaigned on a platform of solvingPakistan’s crippling energy crisis, said the
nuclear reactors would be a “big source
of energy” and increase the nation’s electricity capacity by 15%. According to the
Financial Times, the agreement also benefits the Chinese, who gain new customers for their civilian nuclear technology.
One big concern is that the deal between
China and Pakistan violates the terms of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, comprised of forty-seven
countries, sets strict yet non-binding guidelines on the export and transfer of nuclear
material and technology as well as “dual-use technology.” While it appears the
transfer of two nuclear reactors to Pakistan
would be a violation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, Pakistan is not a
signatory of the NPT and is not bound by
its standards and restrictions. Because of
this, Chinese leaders remain confident that
international opposition will be minimal.
Zhang Li of the Institute of South Asian
Studies at Sichuan University points out
China will likely argue the current project
is an extension of an existing nuclear deal
between Pakistan and China. The original
deal, which led to the construction of the
Chashma nuclear power complex in 2000,
was thus “grandfathered” and exempted
from the Nuclear Suppliers Group guide-
lines. In a phone interview with the New
York Times, Zhang stated “My analysis is
that this issue won’t trigger too much controversy…The Indian government will
certainly respond, but I don’t think that
this will fundamentally harm Sino-Indian
relations, because it’s not something that
has come out of the blue. China and India
have exchanged views on this many times.”
While some Indian politicians may be
vocal in their opposition, it’s likely the
United States will be more subdued, given
that in 2006 the United States signed a civilian nuclear deal with India which similarly
violated the terms of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The United States successfully
petitioned the NSG for a waiver since India, like Pakistan, is not a signatory of the
NPT. Since the Nuclear Suppliers Group
lacks an enforceable treaty and operates
by consensus decision making, it appears
unlikely China or Pakistan will face significant roadblocks on the path towards
nuclear cooperation and energy security.
Last year will rightly be remembered
as the year in which the world came one
step closer to a nuclear peace with Tehran. But it should also be remembered as a
year in which Islamabad made significant
strides to secure its nuclear weapons and
expand its nuclear energy. Collectively,
the actions taken by the Pakistani government in 2013 send encouraging signs to
the international community regarding the
direction of Pakistan’s nuclear program.
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