NEW JERSEY POLICE CHIEF MAGAZINE SEPTEMBER 2026
for all devices within the geofence from 30 minutes before to 30 minutes after the robbery, with each device identified by a unique numerical code. At step one in this case, Google first provided 209 location data points from nineteen accounts that appeared within the geofence during the hour-long period. Second, law enforcement narrows the list of devices and accounts and sends it back to Google. Google shares additional anonymized location data for the selected devices, covering one hour before to one hour after the robbery. Here, Detective Hylton then requested Step Two information from nine accounts identified at Step One. Google responded by producing 680 data points from these accounts over the two-hour period. Finally, at Step Three, law enforcement would again attempt to shorten the list, and Google would provide the username and other identifying information for the requested accounts. At the last step, Detective Hylton requested the subscriber information for three accounts, which Google provided. One of these accounts belonged to the defendant, Chatrie.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
A continued investigation into the defendant resulted in a federal grand jury charging Chatrie with robbery and related firearms offenses. When the case reached the District Court, Chatrie moved to suppress the information the police obtained from Google, arguing that the officers had acquired that data through a Fourth Amendment search, and the warrant allegedly authorizing that search was invalid. The District Court found that the geofence warrant“ plainly violates the rights enshrined in the Fourth Amendment” but denied the motion based on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed on different reasoning, holding that no search occurred because Chatrie“ did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in two hours’ worth of Location History data voluntarily exposed to Google”. The Fourth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and affirmed in a one-sentence per curiam, with the court dividing on whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari solely on the question whether the police violated the Fourth Amendment in obtaining Chatrie’ s location data. The Supreme Court held that police officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired Chatrie’ s location data from Google because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information.
Fourth Amendment Framework
In reaching its holding, the Court relied heavily on Carpenter v. United States. Carpenter held that accessing cell-site location information( CSLI) constitutes a Fourth Amendment search because“ individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements”. There, the Court reasoned that CSLI provides a detailed and encyclopedic portrait of a person’ s whereabouts, and, with that, an intimate window into a person’ s life. Because people have their cell phones all the time, Carpenter explained, a cell phone“ tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner”, and thus faithfully follows him not only through“ public thoroughfares but into private residences, doctor’ s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales”. The Court observed that the“ newfound tracking capacity” that CSLI gives the police“ runs against everyone”, not just those under investigation, and“ travels back in time”, making possible a form of surveillance that would have been unknown prior to the digital age. Carpenter accordingly held that“ allowing government access to cell-site records contravenes” expectations of privacy.
Using Carpenter, the Court concluded that the same privacy principles relied upon in Carpenter to find that law enforcement officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they accessed CSLI records, applied with equal, if not greater, force to the police’ s accessing of Google Location History data. First, the Court explained that the Location History obtained in this case provides an even more fine-tuned picture of a person’ s movements than the data obtained in Carpenter. The Court noted that Location History data can pinpoint the location of a device within twenty meters rather than within sectors of one-eighth to four square miles like in Carpenter. Additionally, it records location data about every two minutes, and may even estimate elevation, potentially indicating which floor of a building a cellphone is on. Secondly, the Court emphasized that Location History“ allows police to reconstruct retrospectively, and with no real effort, people’ s comings and goings in any area, enabling‘ tireless and absolute surveillance’ of any number of people in any number of places”. Finally, the Court concluded that Location History is significantly more connected to the personal details and privacy interest of an individual, as compared to the CSLI data in Carpenter. The Court reasoned that“ Location History is more the cell-phone user’ s own”, and relied on the belief that most cellphone users have no awareness of CSLI records and would never try to retrieve them; whereas, by contrast, Google users regularly employ Location History as a personal journal. The Court went on to compare the resemblance of Location History and other private materials, such as emails, documents, photographs, or calendars. Even if stored on Google’ s servers, a user reasonably views this as his own and expects it to be shielded from the‘ inquisitive eyes’ of the government.
The Court then addressed the Government’ s argument which proposed that accessing only a short amount of cell-phone location information does not count as a Fourth Amendment search. Citing United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 415, the Supreme Court emphasized that even short-term monitoring can provide a wealth of detail about a person’ s familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. The Court refused
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