NEW JERSEY POLICE CHIEF MAGAZINE SEPTEMBER 2026
to create a rule that would only allow Fourth Amendment protections to apply“ only once an intrusion‘ goes too far’”. The Court wrote,“ where the Fourth Amendment applies, it applies regardless of the quality or quantity of information the government obtains. That approach makes even more sense when, as with Location History, law enforcement officials can select the time-limited set of materials they want from an all-encompassing database.”
“ Where the Fourth Amendment applies, it applies regardless of the quality or quantity of information the government obtains.”
The Supreme Court, Chatrie v. United States
Furthermore, the Court considered the Government’ s reliance on the third-party doctrine to argue that Chatrie lost any reasonable expectation of privacy because he authorized Google to store his location history data. The Court disagreed, explaining that Carpenter had previously refused to apply the third-party doctrine to CSLI because such data is fundamentally different than“ telephone numbers and bank records”, traditionally covered under the third-party doctrine. In Carpenter, the Court found that the data obtained was“ incomparably revealing” and was“ not truly‘ shared’ as one normally understands the term” given that cell phones are indispensable to participation in modern society. Here, the Court reasoned that the same principles apply even more strongly to Google Location History. While similar to CSLI, the location history at issue in this case is even more revealing than CSLI and is“ not truly shared” in the normal sense of wanting a third party to see or use it. Sharing such information with Google is incomparable to voluntarily turning information over to a third party because here, the data is generated through ordinary smartphone use and through Google services that users are repeatedly prompted to enable. Rejecting the Government’ s argument that“ generating Location History, unlike producing CSLI, is a voluntary choice,” the Court emphasized that this ignores how and why Google users turn on Location History. Google repeatedly prompts users to turn on the Location History service, often warning that a device may not function properly unless the location feature is enabled. However, Google does so while not clearly explaining nor disclosing how frequently users’ location information would be recorded, how precise it would be, or how it may later be provided to the Government.
The Court emphasized its refusal to adopt an“ app-by-app, feature-by-feature” method of granting Fourth Amendment protection, because this approach misapprehends the nature of modern cell-phone use. In the Court’ s view, nearly every meaningful use of a smartphone requires some affirmative action beyond simply powering on the device. The Government’ s approach attempts to disconnect the activities people do on their cell phones from the mere act of carrying a turned-on cell phone( the thing that generates CSLI). Under this approach, only the location data generated from having a device powered on and in hand would receive Fourth Amendment protection, while treating the ordinary use of smartphone apps and services as voluntary disclosure to a third party. Rejecting this distinction, the Court explained that the point of carrying smartphones is to use what is on them, as Carpenter said, to use the apps and“ services they provide”. Consequently, the Court concluded, that a cell-phone user is not to be viewed as sharing private information with third parties just by doing the ordinary things cell-phone users do, which then can be freely passed on to the government.
Briefly addressing the second prong of the Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court explained that its decision today, holding that a search did occur, does not resolve this case because the Fourth Amendment prohibits only searches that are“ unreasonable.” Because the Fourth Circuit did not address the questions raised by the unusual warrant in this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit must now decide whether, at each step of the search process, the warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’ s requirements of particularity and probable cause.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
The Supreme Court’ s decision in Chatrie v. United States confirms that obtaining a person’ s Google Location History by way of a geofence warrant constitutes a“ search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Court emphasized that Location History is extremely precise, especially revealing, and capable of revealing a person’ s specific whereabouts in both public and private spaces. Importantly, the Court rejected the argument that Fourth Amendment protection is lost merely because the data covered only a short time period, or because the records were stored and produced by Google. For law enforcement, the Chatrie holding indicates that location history data obtained through a geofence warrant must be treated as a Fourth Amendment search from the outset. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to consider the second prong of the Fourth Amendment application: whether, given the warrant issued, the search here was reasonable, meaning that each of its steps was properly described with particularity and found to be supported by probable cause.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR Attorney Eric P. Daigle is the founder and principal attorney of Daigle Law Group, LLC. This nationally recognized law firm specializes in legal consultation and operational management for law enforcement agencies across the United States. Eric is a nationally recognized legal instructor who delivers training on a wide range of critical topics, including use of force, internal affairs investigations, application of the First and Fourth Amendments, operational liability, and agency policy development.
■
Page 9