NATO COIN strategy in Afghanistan.
VVThe there are a few factors that should also be included if we desire to create an optimal normative view of how to foster proper security within an insurgency. Although not included in the mainstream implementation of COIN, time is a factor that is crucial when discussing counter insurgency. As discussed earlier, insurgent tactics usually strike at a well-equipped enemy’s weaknesses. Among many other weaknesses that traditional military’s usually face, time is a commodity that an intervening force has a limited supply of and local opposition forces has an endless supplies of. As a result of this, insurgencies can bleed their enemy’s over years in a low intensity conflict while the traditional military has to make maximum impact in a small and highly scrutinized timetable for action9. This maximum impact is difficult to achieve due to the fragmentation of implementation that occurs in wartime between various militaries, NGO’s, donor groups, and IGO’s. Each of these organizations has there own specialties, tactics, conceptualisms and objectives that differ from each other, and some cases even conflict10.
VVWhat one can gather from an analysis of security, and counterinsurgency is that overall security, and ultimately control, cannot be attained through military action alone. The ideal security operation must make deliberate action to win over local populations. This must be done through a triumvirate of well-coordinated and synchronized actors who adjust their intervention between Kilcullen’s three pillars of control. However, time and cultural human terrain must determine when they are prioritized during the conflict. In a similar fashion to a DJ knowing the correct moment to change tone and tune, an intervention force must be ready to change its priorities and energy at the optimal moment. The initial stages must emphasize military securitization to remove the main opposition. After this is done emphasis must quickly be placed on political reform and socio-economic development. This will legitimize the intervention and remove the base for insurgency. If the order is hampered, unequally distributed or not well coordinated then the entire process can be derailed. Military security without economic and political reform will lead to an insurgency. While too little military securitization and only a political and poorly secured development will lead to ineffective reform and later failures.
8889. Van Creveld: 1991; 239
8810. Layton: 2012
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