The
Geographer
20-21
Spring 2014
Scottish Independence – The American Relationship
Tim Oliver and Oliver Russell, Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University
The USA has yet to take much
notice of the forthcoming
Scottish referendum. For most
average Americans, despite some
religious (especially Presbyterian),
cultural and romantic roots, little
will change. Decision makers in
Washington DC are more aware, but
what concerns them are the effects
of Scottish independence on the
UK, Europe and NATO. Scotland
itself receives little attention.
Despite the historic links between
Scotland and America, average
perceptions tend to be crudely
based upon whisky, tartan and
Braveheart. Heritage does matter,
and a narrative of persecution and
struggle for liberty, connected to
the plight of those who crossed
the Atlantic during the Highland
Clearances, resonates among some
of the 4.8 million Americans who
identify themselves as being of
Scottish descent. However, their
impression of Scotland is unlikely
to change with independence,
and they only comprise 1.7% of
an American population which
includes a multitude of other
European heritages, not to mention
the growing African, Hispanic and
Asian communities. Even Ireland
worries about the relevance of
the US-Irish relationship to a
USA with a changing population.
Independent or not, Scotland will
find itself merged with Europe as
a quaint part of the world, rich in
history, weighed down by seemingly
unaffordable welfare systems, and
increasingly less relevant to average
Americans.
The view from decision makers
in Washington is more nuanced.
Until recently, few thought the
issue mattered, and if they did
they believed independence was
unlikely. The USA administration
is, as always, too busy handling
immediate issues like Ukraine’s
sovereignty. However, several
themes of debate are emerging.
attract investment. Equally, there
are worries that any US investments
could find themselves helping to
foot the costs of independence.
Dealing with separatist movements
is not a distant problem. Some
in DC would lose respect for the
UK if Scotland left without Britain
putting up a determined argument.
Some struggle to understand how a
union, one which once defined the
world, could potentially disappear
quietly into the history books. For
the lawyers especially, the UK’s
failure to move to an inclusive
federal system can seem baffling.
Finally, there is the future of
Trident. Like Britain, the US itself is
preparing to modernise its Trident
system. Britain abandoning Trident,
in part as a consequence of
Scottish independence, could cause
disruption and extra costs for the
Pentagon at a time when its budget
is under pressure.
In dealing with the issue of Quebec,
the US faced similar questions to
those about Scotland and Europe.
During Quebec’s 1995 referendum,
Washington was quick to squash
Quebec nationalists’ expectations
that Quebec would automatically
join NATO, the North American Free
Trade Area, and the US-Canadian
air defence arrangement of NORAD.
Washington will therefore watch
closely how the EU approaches
Scotland.
Some also worry that Scotland’s
referendum could fuel other
referendums that weaken the EU,
America’s largest economic partner.
Other regions could vote to split
their states, some states could
vote to leave the EU, and some
states might hold referendums
on immigration or the euro. And
the US has its own small, but
politically frustrating, independence
movements in Alaska and Hawaii.
The economic uncertainty
around the UK’s break-up could
complicate US-EU trade agreement
negotiations. US investors will also
watch how Scotland proposes to
develop its oil, gas and banking
sectors, and whether it will seek
to undercut the UK or Ireland to
The nuclear debate also has a
strong geopolitical element. The
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany,
Italy and Turkey still have US
nuclear weapons operated on
dual-key systems. A UK without
nuclear weapons may play a role
in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy
and Belgium deciding to follow
suit, leaving only France and Turkey
as nuclear-capable states. This,
combined with the splitting and
further weakening of Britain’s
military, will only add to American
frustrations at its European allies’
weaknesses on defence.
“Independent
or not, Scotland
will find itself…
increasingly
less relevant
to average
Americans.”
Tim Oliver is a Fritz
Thyssen TAPIR
post-doctoral
fellow at the Center
for Transatlantic
Relations
(CTR). Oliver Russell
is a researcher
at CTR, and a
graduate student
in International
Relations an