The China Investor Volume 1, Issue 2 | Page 16

因为未能获得对外投资批准会使得买方无法使用中国 资金办理交易交割,也会使得买方无法使用中国资本 支付反向解约金。交易对象以多种方式解决了此问题, 包括要求买方在签字时将费用金额存入中国境外托管 账户中(尽管这需要使用海外资金);要求买方获得非 中国担保人出具的信用证或担保函,为买方向投资对 象支付费用的义务提供担保;或要求买方从中国担保 人处获得信用证或担保函,为买方向投资对象的中国 子公司支付费用的义务提供担保。 美国外国投资委员会的作用:风险性质 美国外国投资委员会有权审查任何会导致某位外国人 管控某家现有美国企业的交易,审查其对美国国家安 全的影响。 2 委员会执行30天的“审查”程序,若其认为 受到担保,则执行45天的“调查”程序。此后,在考虑任 何资产剥离或其他交割承诺后,各方当事人可以与委员 会协商减轻国家安全风险,美国外国投资委员会可以 证明交易未造成任何未解决的国家安全隐患,或将交 易报告给主席。 收到此报告后,主席可以允许交易继续进行,禁止其继 续进行,或对于已经交割的交易,不采取任何措施或要 求交易停止。 向美国外国投资委员会告知交易是自愿的。然而,若各 方当事人认为美国外国投资委员会将会对某项交易感 兴趣,他们通常会通过正式联合申请的方式通知委员 会。通过积极采取行动,各方当事人会提高谈判驱动力 并提高取得有利结果的可能性。 美国外国投资委员会审查的交易中只有一小部分会被 提交给主席或者被各方当事人在此等行动之前撤销, 此小部分交易仅仅是美国外国直接投资交易的一部 分。 3 然而,美国外国投资委员会可能会建议主席采取 行动,或者只有在各方当事人接受有偿减损条款的条件 下才不会建议主席采取行动,这对于很多涉及中国投 资者的交易是一项重大风险。资深顾问可以帮助各方 当事人在编制各方当事人的申请文件和与委员会谈判 时预期美国外国投资委员会对潜在交易的态度,以减 轻不利措施的风险。 风险分摊 当各方当事人拟向美国外国投资委员会递交申请时,他 们一般会在其交易协议中提供以下内容:各方履行交易 义务的前提条件是已经获得“美国外国投资委员会批 准”,美国外国投资委员会批准的定义是美国外国投资 委员会通知各方当事人其已认定不存在任何因交易造 成的未解决的国家安全隐患,或者主席决定允许交易 继续进行(在美国外国投资委员会请求主席做出此等 决策的情况下)。买方履行交割义务的另一项条件是美 国外国投资委员会在做出批准时不会规定任何“过分 15 transaction, they typically notify the committee through a formal joint filing. By acting proactively, parties improve the negotiating dynamic and the likelihood of a favorable outcome. Only a small fraction of transactions reviewed by CFIUS, which represent only a fraction of the foreign direct investment transactions in the United States, are forwarded to the president or are withdrawn by the parties in advance of such action. 3 Yet the possibility that CFIUS will recommend presidential action, or will only not recommend presidential action only if the parties accept onerous mitigation terms, represents a material risk for many transactions involving Chinese investors. Experienced counsel can substantially help parties to anticipate CFIUS’s attitude toward potential deals and, in preparing the parties’ filings and negotiating with the committee, to reduce the risk of adverse actions. RISK ALLOCATION When parties intend to file with CFIUS, they generally provide the following in their transaction agreement: Each party’s obligation to close will be conditioned on “CFIUS approval” having been obtained, defining such term as CFIUS notifying the parties that it has determined that there are no unresolved national security concerns A buyer can try to persuade a wary target by offering either a high premium or a high reverse termination fee. posed by the transaction, or the president electing to allow the transaction to proceed (where CFIUS has requested such decision). The buyer’s obligation to close will further be conditioned on CFIUS not imposing any “burdensome conditions” in providing its approval, such as any conditions having a material adverse effect on the target (or the buyer and the target) post-closing, orthat would materially impair the economic benefit the buyer expected to derive from the transaction. Each party will be obligated to use its reasonable best efforts to take all actions necessary, proper or advisable to obtain CFIUS approval. Often such actions are specified to include the buyer consenting to a range of mitigation conditions, including limitations on its freedom of action with respect to, or ability to retain, the target’s assets or businesses post-closing, or to exclude the buyer consenting to the same burdensome conditions described above. Each party will also have a right to terminate the transaction if CFIUS approval is not obtained by a defined THE CHINA INVESTOR