条件”，比如任何对交割后投资对象
(或买家及投资对象）具有重大不良
影响的条件，或将给买家预期从交
易中获得的经济利益带来重大损害
的条件。
此外，各方有义务尽其最大努力采取
所有必要、适当或可取的措施，获得
美国外国投资委员会批准。此等措
施通常包含买方同意一系列减损条
件，比如对其在交割后对交易对象
的资产或业务采取行动的自由或获
得交易对象的资产或业务的能力的
限制，或者将买方同意相同“过分条
件”排除在外。
若未在规定日期之前获得美国外国
投资委员会批准，或者主席根据美
国外国投资委员会法规发出命令，
禁止交割，各方还有权终止交易。在
某些情况下，因此等原因终止交易
将会导致买方必须履行支付反向解
约金的义务。
在中国政府对外投资的批准中，将
反向解约金与美国外国投资委员会
事件挂钩会补偿交易对象可能发生
的机会成本，并将风险分摊给买方。
长期以来，中国投资者一直拒绝同
意为其认为对于国家安全利益过分
敏感的美国监管措施支付费用。然
而，对于买方而言，与提供更高额的
保费相比，反向解约金是一种解决
交易对象对美国外国投资委员会风
险的担忧的更高效的方式。并且投
资者态度确实可能会朝着此方向不
断变化。在最近的一项交易中，买方
承诺按交易对象股权价值的2%支
付美国外国投资委员会相关反向解
约费，然后将此等费用提高至股权
价值的2.5%，作为对竞争性报价的
回应。
重 新 分摊 美 国 外 国 投 资委员会
风险的另一种方式是买方同意
进行交易交割，即使 美国外国投
资委员会要求有偿 减 损。为此，
可以 定 义合 理 的 买 方最 大 努力
义 务 ，来 可 以 仅 排 除 一 小 类 过
分 条 件，或 者 不 排 除 过 分 条 件
(所谓的“绝对责任条款”)。
值得注意的是，这并不会消除美国
外国投资委员会风险，因为无任何
条款要求美国外国投资委员会在向
WWW.THECHINAINVESTOR.COM
date or if the president issues an order
under the CFIUS statute prohibiting
the closing. In some cases, termination
for such reasons will trigger the buyer’s
obligation to pay a reverse termination
fee. As in the context of the Chinese
government outbound approvals, tying
reverse termination fees to CFIUS events
compensates the target for possible
opportunity costs and allocates risk
to the buyer. Chinese investors have
historically resisted agreeing to pay a
fee for U.S. regulatory actions that they
perceive as overly-sensitive to national
security interests.
However reverse termination fees can
be a more efficient way for a buyer
to address a target’s concerns about
CFIUS risk than offering a higher
deal premium. And indeed investor
attitudes may be evolving in this
direction. In one recent transaction, the
buyer committed to paying a CFIUS-
related reverse termination fee of
approximately 2 percent of the target’s
equity value and later raised such fee to
2.5 per cent of equity value in response
to a competing bid.
Another way to reallocate CFIUS risk is
for the buyer to agree to close the
transaction even if CFIUS demands
onerous mitigation. To do so, the buyer’s
reasonable best efforts obligation can
be defined to exclude only a narrow
category of burdensome conditions, or
not to exclude burdensome conditions
at all (a so-called “hell or high water
clause”). Notably, this does not eliminate
CFIUS risks, as nothing requires CFIUS to
propose mitigation conditions before
reporting a transaction to the president.
RISKS OF THIRD-PARTY
FINANCING FROM CHINESE
SOURCES: NATURE OF THE RISK
Like other cross-border investors,
Chinese outbound investors often rely
on third-party debt or equity financing
to fund corporate investments. Potential
targets scrutinize such funding sources
for their ability to make the proposed
funding and their commitment to
do so, as set-forth in a commitment
letter delivered prior to the signing of
the underlying transaction. Definitive
financing documents are finalized
in the pre-closing period and the
funding is made at closing.
Invest in the US?
投资美国？
- Marcus & MIllichap -
Largest national commercial real
estate brokerage for
investment property
投资性房地产业
中最大的全国性商业地产经纪公司
我们的团队如何不同？
我们是你的团队！
Additional issues arise when Chinese
investors rely on equity co-investors
16