然而，与非中国投资者相
比，中国投资者对外国投
资对象带来的风险更大，
竞争能力较有限。
已公布的法规规定了一种快速，且在很大程度上有限
的审查流程。2016年初，很多中国投资者及其顾问认
为该流程可预测，且风险较低。
然而，很多交易的实际情况不同。2016年底至2017年，
为应对不断下降的外汇储备，中国政府使用批准需求
杠杆限制对外投资。市场参与者预计，国家发展和改革
委员会审查需要六周或更长时间，尽管监管机构规定
的期限是7个工作日。许多交易登记被中国国家外汇管
理局拒绝。
2016年12月，政府确认，其正在加强对特定领域和特定
类别投资者进行的交易的检查，而且还需要采取其他
程序，即使是在已签订的交易未完成交割的情况下。 1
风险分摊
近几个月中，中国政府显露出支持继续境外投资的迹
象。但市场在审批流程中的风险认知已经发生变化。
获得批准的策略和未获得批准的后果目前是缔约各方
当事人业务层面的问题，这些问题通常在谈判早期讨
论。
交易协议已经制定了一种应对风险的常用方法：各方履
行交割义务的前提条件是：已经获得交易所需的中华
人民共和国政府所有批准，和任何政府实体未出台任
何法律或发出任何命令禁止交割。
若交易因以下原因终止，买方将必须向投资对象支付
“反向解约金”：若因截至规定的终止日未获得中国政府
批准而导致交易终止（但买方的所有其他交割条件均
已经满足)，通常是在签约后6-10个月；或者某个中国
政府实体达成禁止交割的不可上诉法律或命令。
与中国政府批准相关的反向解约金存在很大差异，在
近期公共交易中，反向解约金最低为投资对象的股本
价值的2.9%，最高为股本价值的7.8%。费用越高，转
移至买方的批准风险越多，但很难评估在任何特定案
件中已经分摊的费用究竟有多少。买方可以尝试通过
提供高额保费或高额反向解约金说服谨慎的投资对象
进行投资。若交易未交割，对不同交易对象产生的机会
成本可能不同，取决于交易对象的财务状况和是否有
替代出价者。安排上述费用的支付是一个特殊的问题，
WWW.THECHINAINVESTOR.COM
Transaction agreements have developed a common
approach to addressing the risks: Each party’s obligation
to close will be conditioned on all PRC government
approvals for the transaction having been obtained, and
no law or order from any government entity being in place
that prohibits the closing.
The buyer will be required to pay the target a “reverse
termination fee” if the transaction is terminated due to
the Chinese government approvals not having been
obtained (but all of buyer’s other closing conditions
having been satisfied) as of a defined end date, typically
six to ten months after signing, or a Chinese government
entity entering an unappealable law or order that
prohibits the closing.
Reverse termination fees related to Chinese government
approvals vary widely, in recent public deals from as low as
2.9 per cent of the target’s equity value to 7.8 per cent of
equity value. Higher fees shift more of the approval risk to
the buyer, but it is difficult to assess how much has been
allocated in any particular case. A buyer can try to persuade
a wary target by offering either a high premium or a high
reverse termination fee. And the failure of a transaction to
close may result in different opportunity costs for different
targets, depending on the target’s financial health and the
availability of alternate suitors.
Arranging for these fees to be paid presents a unique
problem, for just as the failure to obtain outbound
approvals prevents the buyer from using Chinese capital
to close the transaction, so too does it prevent the buyer
from using Chinese capital to pay the reverse termination
fee. Targets have addressed this issue in a variety of ways,
including requiring the buyer to deposit the fee amount in
an escrow account outside of China at the time of signing
(though this requires access to offshore funds); requiring
the buyer to obtain a letter of credit or guarantee from a
non-Chinese guarantor to secure the buyer’s obligation to
pay the fee to the target; or requiring the buyer to obtain a
letter of credit or a guarantee from a Chinese guarantor to
secure the buyer’s obligation to pay the fee to the target’s
Chinese subsidiary.
THE ROLE OF CFIUS: NATURE OF THE RISK
CFIUS has the authority to examine any transaction
that results in a foreign person controlling an existing
U.S. business for its impact on U.S. national security. 2
The committee proceeds via a 30-day “review” and, if it
believes warranted, a 45-day “investigation.” Thereafter,
and taking into account any divestitures or other post-
closing commitments that the parties may negotiate
with the committee to mitigate national security risks,
CFIUS can either certify that the transaction presents no
unresolved national security concerns, or instead report
the transaction to the president.