Space Education and Strategic Applications Journal
Space Administration were key blockers to a unified U . S . policy ( Vedda , 2016 ). The NSC looks to enact U . S . space policy for commercial development , sustainable human presence , and expanding opportunity for Americans to live and work in space . This matches long-term goals to achieve these same results not only in Earth orbits but also creating a human presence on the Moon , Mars and further ( Office of Space Commerce , 2020 ). This governmental structure could be key to space ’ s reconsideration as a critical infrastructure area .
Further evidence supporting establishing a U . S . space critical infrastructure sector was the recent establishment of a Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center ( ISAC ) ( Space ISAC , 2020 ). The Space ISAC was added to the national council of ISACS which establishes cross-sector coordination for sharing information about cyber and physical threats , mitigation strategies , and bringing partners together ( Miller , 2020 ). This organization looks to identify possible threats to the supply chain , business systems and missions associated with space . The early establishment of this ISAC could help reduce cost and administrative difficulties in nominating a space infrastructure sector . ISACs were established as part of the original critical infrastructure protection plan by PPD-63 ( Clinton , Presidential Decision Directive / NSC-63 " Critical Infrastructure Protection , 1998 ). Some suggest the original ISAC intention was only to coordinate on cyber threats but the NCI mission statement suggests both cyber and physical threat information are routinely reviewed ( National Council of ISACs , 2020 ). As some organizations seem to exist to protect some space aspects , the next consideration should be what threats would routinely be faced by space critical infrastructure .
The term , “ threat ” drives protection discussion sbut thoroughness demands one also evaluate vulnerabilities . Active threats usually are driven by state , non-state , or criminal actors who intend to damage U . S critical infrastructure as part of economic or political goals . State actors are nations who can afford more advanced means to commit kinetic and non-kinetic actions either in orbit or against terrestrial sites ( Bateman , 2020 ). High entry barriers to space conflict suggests the most likely U . S . opponents would be Russia or China ( Edmonds , 2020 ). Non-state actors as terrorist groups , other political activists , or even corporate entities may also have unique goals for the space environment from destruction to establishing resource-yielding norms regarding extraterrestrial development . John Klein ’ s close examination of terrorist group ’ s potential capability to operate in the space environment proved largely negative ( Klein , 2020 ). Criminal groups seek to obtain an illegal economic advantage through group . Terrorists and criminals are equally deterred from direct orbital actions based on the high entry costs for orbital operations but could still use cyber-attacks , sabotage , or influences on earth-based infrastructure to achieve desired effects .
The other half of risk , vulnerabilities , arise from the difficulties found naturally in the space environment .
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