Evaluating Space as the Next Critical Infrastructure Sector
food services ( 72 ). Each of these sectors could include multiple other sectors for evaluation . Construction would cover building satellite receiving stations and launch facilities while Information would cover satellite telecommunications and most navigation or timing systems . The last addition for accommodation and food services covers the possibility of developing and deploying commercial residence or other forms of space tourism ( Highfill , Georgi , & Dubria , 2019 ). These assessments are contained in a new BEA project launch document aiming to compile more detailed space economic references by late 2020 ( Highfill , Georgi , & Dubria , 2019 ).
A more logical separation for space infrastructure would consider launch , ground control , orbital functions , and manufacturing as separate sub-sectors . Globally , the 2018 FAA Compendium of Commercial Space Transportation refers first to satellite and non-satellite industry as a roughly 3-1 margin globally , $ 260B to $ 84B . In a further breakdown , the same chart lists global investments as satellite television ($ 97B ), government budgets ($ 82B ), satellite ground equipment ($ 60B ), navigation ($ 52B ) fixed satellite service ($ 17B ) satellite manufacturing ($ 13B ) and launch ($ 5.5B ) ( FAA , 2018 ). One of the biggest problems appears again as multiple government evaluators select different comparisons across the space industry . Regrouping these functions puts the global value as roughly $ 160B for orbital functions , $ 82B for government space , $ 73B for ground control , and $ 5.5B for launch . As government space functions were not segregated through this study the best option would likely consider government space a different section for infrastructure .
Over the next several years , space access and functions will probably decrease in per capita value while increasing overall space assets numbers . This cost reduction increase space functional impacts across societies as space-based possibilities emerge for previously unconsidered commercial solutions . A National Defense University presentation suggests increasing launch rates by a factor of 9 creates a 3x cost reduction per kg of payload ( Stockdale , Aughenbaugh , & Boensch , 2018 ). This decrease will match with a lowering of individual asset costs and decreases in associated support costs as insurance and financing for space becomes better understood . Even further , new business models will likely open paths for investment and implementation opportunities which are not yet even envisioned , similar to if one could invest in digital music or smartphones in the 1980s ( Partnership for Conflict , Crime , And Security Research , 2016 ).
In its present form , the National Space Council ( NSC ) was established in 1989 under the Bush administration , closed under the Clinton Administration and did not reappear under 2016 under the Trump administration . The Secretary of Commerce is a key member of this board whose designed mirrors previous National Security Council structures to raise space issues to the executive branch level within the government . Under most administrations , conflict between the DOD for military space , and the National Aeronautics and
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