interests should be elevated above everybody else? He concludes that
there is no objective difference which legitimizes the promotion of my
self-interest over the interests of others. This helps us understand why
we should consider others in our decision making. The reason is that
“their needs and desires are comparable to our own.” (Rachels, 2018,
p.89) When we think about a starving child, we have to conclude that the
needs of that child for food are no different to our own, they are affected
by hunger just like we are. There is no factual difference that can justify
not meeting his needs for food but believing that our needs must be met.
However, Cottingham tells us that there are contexts where self-interest
is not arbitrary but exactly what morality demands. For example, if my
own child were starving would it be immoral to give away my last bowl
of rice to that child in preference to any other starving child? Cottingham
argues that “the parent is...under a specific duty to be partial. The duties
of a parent involve giving special weight and interests to the interest
and needs of his own children, precisely because they are” (Cottingham,
1983, p.97). And this goes also for obligations to others that we are close
to (friends, family etc). To deny these special relationships would “be a
world in much of what gives human life preciousness and significance
has disappeared” (Cottingham, 1983, p.90). We cannot ignore these
bonds - to do so “is to propose a concept of morality which seems
inconsistent with our very humanity” (Cottingham, 1983, p.89).
In conclusion, we have considered whether acting out of self-interest
is immoral, or put another way, whether self-interest can offer a basis
for morality. Attempts to justify egoism as improving society as a whole
fail to recognise that improving society is a by-product of egoism, not
its objective. Rand turns the debate on its head, arguing that altruism
crushes the individual and asks us to embrace egoism as the only ethic
that puts the individual first. This argument depends on presenting
altruism and ethical egoism as the only viable moral alternatives. This
fails to acknowledge any middle ground whereby sometimes self-
interest will win out, but at other times the interests will take priority.
We have seen that self-interest could be considered the fundamental
principle that underpins common sense morality. The difficulty here
is that although ethical egoism may often be consistent with common
sense morality, for example the duty to avoid causing harm, this only
holds until the egoist’s self-interest is improved by deviating from the
rule. We considered the obvious objection to acting out of self-interest,
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