SotA Anthology 2018-19 | Page 115

namely that it might endorse wicked acts. Rachels believes that this is a valid complaint against self-interest, but Machan has argued that the enlightened egoist would see that wicked acts are unlikely to be in his or her long term interest. Baier rejects self-interest as unable to resolve conflicts which is a fundamental requirement of any moral code. The defender of self- interest tells us that we should not be concerned about this - life is full of conflicts that cannot be resolved to the mutual benefit of the parties and one party must win the struggle. This argument therefore is not sufficient to determine self-interest as immoral but does require us to accept that dividing the world into two categories (ourselves and everyone else) who are treated differently is justifiable. It seems that generally there is no justifiable factual difference between the categories to support such a division. This tells us why we should care about people other than ourselves (and reject self-interest) if we want to be moral. As Rachel writes “we are on a par with one another, that is the deepest reason why our morality must include some recognition of the needs of others, and why, then, ethical egoism fails as a moral theory” (Rachels, 2018, p.90). This is the most compelling reason to accept that self-interest is indeed immoral. Clearly there are situations where self- interest is moral (eg close family relationships) and Cottingham makes a powerful case for this. We have to conclude that simple self-interest as a moral code is too simplistic to be a universal basis for action, even if we can find sometimes identify cases where it can be justified. References Baier, K. (1958) The Moral Point of View. Ithaca: Cornell University Press Baier, K. (1993) ‘Egoism’, in: P. Singer, ed. A Companion to Ethics. London: Blackwell Cottingham, J (1983) ‘Ethics and Impartiality,’ Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 43 (1), pp. 83-99. Machan, T. R. (1979) ‘Recent Work in Ethical Egoism’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1), pp. 1-15. Rachels, J. (2018) The Elements of Moral Philosophy. 9th ed. New York: McGraw Hill Education. University of Southern Illinois. Baier. 115