SotA Anthology 2018-19 | Page 113

morally wrong. Hence in cases like these no moral judgements apply. This is obviously absurd” (Baier, 1958, p.4). Hospers replies to this concern by pointing out that Baier’s example involves “two acts of the same kind, namely attempted murder (or the attempt to foil the murder attempt of the other)” but not the same act. He says “there is no contradiction in two such acts being attempted or in both being right” (Machan, 1979, p.7). We are not saying that the same action is both right and wrong at the same time, only that two different actions are not contradictory. This is neatly summarized by Rachels who describes the moralist like a “Commissioner of Boxing” (Rachels, 2018, p.86) whose job is to get each fighter to do his best but no more. What the moralist is not is “a courtroom judge who resolves disputes” (ibid.). In many cases, it will be in the long-term interest of each of the two parties to compromise and reach a solution. In cases where self-interests genuinely conflict then ethical egoism will not be able to mediate those conflicts. The ethical egoist is not concerned about this - one of the parties winning out through an unmediated ‘fight’ is part of life and should be accepted as such. For the egoist, “life is essentially a long series of conflicts in which each person is struggling to come out on top … each person [has] the right to do his or her best to win” (Rachels, 2018, p.86). If we accept the egoist’s conclusion that life is indeed a struggle in which I have to promote my interests above everyone else’s, Rachels points out an obvious difficulty. Egoism means dividing “the world into two categories of people - ourselves and all the rest” (Rachels, 2018, p.89). The theory demands that we treat the interests of ‘the rest’ as less important than our own. But what is the justification, if any, for this differential treatment? If there is no basis for treating me differently to everyone else then we have to conclude that ethical egoism is indeed “unacceptably arbitrary.” There are reasons in practice why we might choose to treat one person or group of people differently to another which are perfectly legitimate. For example, Rachels asks us to imagine two subjects applying to law school. One scored well on the admissions test while the second never took the test. It would not be arbitrary to admit the first to candidate to the law school but not the second because the candidates are clearly not equally well qualified. Rachels asks “what makes me so special” that my 113