keystone of their very use and application. However, there are several
problems with the efficacy of moral judgment in enacting these features.
Firstly, even if one recognises the need to invoke a moral principle in
a situation, it is still difficult to determine exactly what action should be
taken to satisfy that moral principle. It is easy to imagine, and perhaps
more often than not the case, that in a moral situation there are multiple
possible actions that could be taken to satisfy the moral principle. It is
therefore a problem when dealing with universal principles, that, due
to their universality, they lack specifications for particular application,
leaving the moral agent without clear guidance on what to do in a difficult
situation. Another problem with moral judgment is related to the second
mentioned feature, namely, that moral judgment is unable to recognise
in the first place when the act of judgment needs to occur. Judgment,
as the relation of situation to principle, necessarily requires the agent
to already recognise and be aware of the morally salient features of a
situation, in order to begin the process of judgment and the invoking
of the moral principle. Where then, does this recognition lie? In the
phenomena of moral perception. Moral perception is the faculty by which
the agent is aware of moral features of a situation, aware of the situation
of being a moral situation (Vetlesen, 1993, p.4). It is an intuitive faculty,
one that is ‘formed and informed by our general values and principles’
(Blum, 1991, p.702).
Now that the importance and meaning of moral judgment and moral
perception have been expounded, I will now move to elucidate some of
the problems that moral perception creates for principle-based ethical
theories. I will begin with moral operations that are omitted, or, are
outside the scope of moral judgment, but, nonetheless, are important
moral functions of the agent.
The first moral operation is that of the perceiving of the moral features
in a moral situation (Blum, 1991, p.709). It is perfectly reasonable to
imagine a moral situation whereby the agent simply doesn’t perceive the
morally significant features of the situation, thereby not recognising that
the situation is in fact a moral one. Through this, there would be no way
to enact the process by which moral action would be achieved. This is not
someone who simply chooses not to act in a moral situation, but rather,
is genuinely ignorant of its moral character all together. The process
of moral judgment cannot be enacted here, and this is something that
principle-based ethical theories simply are not able to provision for.
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