Kant and the problem of
moral perception
BA Philosophy student Josh Hibbert applies a Kantian perspective to consider moral perception as
part of the second-year module PHIL239: Moral Philosophy.
In the following paper I shall be exploring the difficulties presented
by philosophers like Lawrence Blum who hold the position that moral
perception necessarily exists prior to and can act independently of
ethical principles. This position intends to demonstrate that principle-
based ethical theories are incoherent, as a perception of what is morally
salient in a given situation is necessary before one can understand that
a given ethical principle should be invoked. Since these principle-based
ethical theories do not account for the existence of moral perception as
prior to their respective moral principles, this is seen as a fundamental
flaw in their structure. I will call this the problem of moral perception.
I intend first to give an account of the above position, beginning with
a general sketch of the genesis of the problem, then, describing the
distinct moral operations supposedly omitted by principle-based ethical
theories and two ways moral perception reveals a limit for principle-
based ethical theories. I will move to evaluate these problems from a
Kantian perspective. I will seek to show that moral perception does not
pose an irreconcilable problem for principle-based ethical theories and
that these problems can be resolved with reference to the Kantian notion
of reflective judgment and a complementary conception of rules of moral
salience.
Before the problem of moral perception can be understood, we must first
examine the terms and concepts involved in its formulation. A common
term in moral philosophy is that of ‘judgment’, which Blum defines as
‘the faculty that bridges the gap between moral principles and situations’
(Blum, 1991, pp.701-702). In other words, moral judgment is the process
by which the agent determines a moral course of action in relation to
a situation with moral importance. There are two important features
of moral judgment: knowing what the moral rule requires in a given
situation and the recognition of features of a situation as having moral
significance (Blum, 1991, pp.709-711). Moral judgment, then, is of utmost
relevance and importance for principle-based ethical theories, as it is the
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