The second moral operation omitted by principle-based ethical theories
is the recognition of moral features of a situation as, in themselves,
moral features (Blum, 1991, p.710). This is a distinct problem from the
previous omission. In this situation, it is possible for an agent to actually
perceive the moral features of a moral situation, but not recognise
them as moral features, rather as simply neutral features of a situation.
This is critical to moral action, as without it, it would be impossible to
even recognise a situation as a moral one. If we use the analogy of a
computer coded to present outcomes to moral situations, and present
to the computer a situation within which person A insults person B, we
would first have to present the computer with information that such a
situation requires to be morally judged by its procedure in the first place
(Herman, 1985, pp.416-417). In other words, for material to be judged,
for a moral situation to be related to a moral principle, it is first necessary
for that material to be marked as needing to be judged. Moral judgment,
then, is not the first step in moral action, rather, it is moral perception
in identifying moral situations. This is one crucial moral operation not
addressed by principle-based ethical theories.
A way in which moral perception reveals a limit to the principles of
those ethical theories that make them their foundation are occurrences
within which moral perception and the resultant action from it can go on
completely outside of those principles (Blum, 1991, p.712). Moral action
derived from compassion is an example of this. Suppose a young child
is clearly upset and discomforted because its favourite toy has fallen out
of reach. The agent perceives the child’s discomfort, and due to this,
reaches and gives the toy back to the child. The agent’s action here is not
mediated by any rule or principle, they didn’t have to use moral judgment
to determine what the right cause of action was. Rather, the cause for
action, the retrieval of the toy, was bound up in the perceiving of the
child’s discomfort itself. This moral action occurred entirely beyond and
independent of moral principles or maxims and was generated entirely
by moral perception, via an emotional response to the perceived. In
this way, we see that in some cases, ethical principles are not the sole
generator of moral action.
Another important way in which moral perception operates beyond the
scope of ethical principles is found in the goodness of moral perception
itself (Blum, 1991, p.713). We praise individuals who have accurate moral
perception, who see the rightness or wrongness of a situation, even if
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