2. Maximize and synchronize DDR communication efforts – through government
offices, the media, advocacy groups, civil society groups, and public forums.
Build trust and maintain this trust.
Implication.
1. Without support from the highest levels of government and without the involvement of the society, advocacy groups, donors, and other interested parties, DDR
will not be successful.
2. Without winning the hearts and minds and establishing long-lasting trust, DDR
cannot be successful. Therefore, all promises made to ex-combatants like
resettlement, truth and reconciliation, social support, and employment training
should be met; otherwise, ex-combatants will feel betrayed and may again resort
to fighting.
Event Description.
This lesson was based on classroom readings and past experiences by students
discussed during U.S. Army War College PKSOI elective course PS2229 –
Security Sector Reform: A Whole of Government Approach.
3. CONCLUSION
Recent SSR experiences (lessons in this Sampler – covering Burundi, Liberia,
Afghanistan, the Philippines, Timor-Leste, and Chile) showcase the importance
of judicious, comprehensive SSR plans/programs for fragile countries working
toward a better future. Key points from these various SSR endeavors include:
SSR provisions need to be included in every peace agreement. Try to
avoid a “one-size-fits-all” approach and tailor SSR provisions to the
host nation situation; support comprehensive SSR provisions by
meaningful implementation mechanisms and appropriate international
support; and, avoid overselling SSR which could lead to unrealistic
expectations.
Put “politics” center stage; i.e., establish mechanisms to address and
resolve “political” issues/disputes. There is a need to understand the
“politics” of SSR and to pay attention at the outset to the impact that
the political arrangements installed under a peace agreement might
have on the implementation of SSR; encourage mutual trust,
consensus building, and national reconciliation through the peace
negotiations as an essential component of post-conflict security
strategy; support and empower NGOs, civil society organizations
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