From left to right: AUSA President and former AFRICOM Commander GEN (R) Carter Ham, USAWC
Commandant MG John Kem, former Deputy Commanding General to AFRICOM VADM (R) Michael Franken,
and Commander, Allied Joint Forces Command Brunssum, GEN Riccardo Marchiò.
Photo by Chris Browne, PKSOI
case of Georgia is central to NATO strategy; the foundation
with Georgia is very strong. NATO should consider admit-
ting Georgia immediately to send a message to President Putin
that he does not get to veto the sovereignty of states, or to get a
separate Russian sphere of interest. The political situation has
to be right and Georgia has to be ready. The best option would
have been to introduce rotational forces into Georgia immedi-
ately after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Georgia is building
a deep sea port in Anaklia, which will be the primary Black
Sea “Silk Road” port connecting China to the European trade
community, thus greatly enhancing Georgia’s economic value.
The Anaklia port alone should emphasize the need for NATO
rotational forces in Georgia to prevent future Russian incur-
sions. A continued Georgian shortfall is a lack of a Coast Guard
for Black Sea security.
NATO territory on the pretense of defending a Russian minori-
ty population. Russia does not follow a truly hybrid warfare or
Gerasimov doctrine, but instead, adheres to a classic Russian
misinformation campaign, including manipulating troop move-
ment numbers. If the U.S. were to permanently base troops in
Poland, such an action would elicit a Russian response, likely
pushing troops into Belarus. For such an action, the U.S. must
conduct this action with the support of NATO. Any perceived
action to provoke Russia must understand that Russia only
respects strength in numbers and equipment. Russia dominates
the information space, a component of their misinformation
campaign. Thus, the U.S. and NATO must greatly enhance their
narrative, focusing on Russia’s wrongdoings.
• When the US calls for NATO partners to provide more than
their required 2%, NATO needs to consider incentivizing part-
ners to give more, which may not be in funds. NATO needs to
create a formula that counts infrastructure improvement/expan-
sion that has demonstrable military value (railway, bridges, etc.).
Germany provides an excellent example. Rather than provide
more tanks, they could dedicate rail assets to better move
NATO equipment and troops to target areas in the Baltics and
Poland.
• Russia has no desire to take on the 29 countries of NATO,
and resents and fears NATO cohesion most of all. The goal of
many Russian activities are to wreck the international order and
challenge the cohesion of the alliance. Russia’s strategic aim
against NATO is to demonstrate the alliance cannot adequately
defend member states. If Russian leaders believe this objective
has been achieved, then they might miscalculate and invade
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