complexities that lie in any activity conducted across interagency lines as well as those inherent in intergovernmental relations
this is nowhere more pronounced than in the crafting of a security cooperation plan. Within the DoD, security cooperation
plans begin at the Combatant Commander (CCDR) level with
the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). CCDRs then direct each
theater service component to write its supporting document
called a Campaign Support Plan (CSP). Although the U.S.
military codifies its procedures for action through authoritative
guidance on fundamental principles in doctrine, the method
for how a component command crafts its CSP is not prescribed.
Joint and service doctrine contain references that guide both
planning and security cooperation. Therefore, it is logical to
conclude there is a description of how to best conduct security
cooperation planning. In reality, however, there is a limited
body of security cooperation doctrine and what is currently
published only provides minimal guidance on planning.
In 2012, The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy published the most commonly referenced document regarding security cooperation planning, The Theater Campaign
Planning Planner’s Handbook. While this is a credible resource,
it is not prescriptive in nature and, therefore, not policy. Instead,
its greatest utility is as a primer for planners as they work within
their headquarters planning process to design their distinct
operational approach to security cooperation. Additionally,
DoD does not currently shape security cooperation planning
through published doctrine although the publication of Joint
Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation in the near future will
help fill this void. Security cooperation is briefly discussed in
other joint doctrine publications; however, no joint publication
establishes a specific procedure for conducting security cooperation planning.
The Army has published three security cooperation references.
In March 2013, Army Regulation 11-31, Army Security Cooperation Policy, was published. AR 11-31 was soon followed by
the publication of Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-31,
Army Security Cooperation Handbook, which was updated in
February 2015. DA PAM 11-31 has a chapter on security cooperation planning, but like the planner’s handbook it is generic
in nature and more of a source of information not instruction.
Lastly, there is Army Field Manual 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation that contains a chapter entitled “Planning and
Assessment Considerations.” In the title alone the reader can see
that the contents are things for planners to consider and not a
method for how to conduct security cooperation planning. This
leaves the prescription on planning processes to the 5-0 series in
Joint or Army doctrine. The Joint Operation Planning Process
( JOPP) and Military Decision Making Process (MDMP),
although not specific to security cooperation planning, are the
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only doctrinal detailed planning processes presented to produce
a plan or order.2
Previous Practices
Security cooperation planning at Army South focused on individual actions or events, but lacked a larger purpose other than
building relationships. Army South routinely programmed and
delivered the next calendar year’s list of activities that supported
United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) directed security cooperation tasks throughout Latin America, without outlining the expected Army objectives for these activities.
Moreover, without defined end states, Army South could not
develop a way to measure the partner nations’ progress towards
the objectives, or even if these actions were effective solutions.
In 2013, Army South leadership refocused on the operational objectives, rather than just the programmed activities, and
identified several gaps between programmed activities and
constructive purposes leading to the achievement of operational
objectives. In addition to pushing the staff for detailed answers
about security cooperation activity, leaders also began to assess
processes by which the headquarters planned security cooperation. As noted by Hartmayer, M. and Hansen, J. (2013), commanders must assess the prioritization of steady-state security
cooperation tasks in contrast to other mission essential tasks,
as arguably security cooperation is the most important because
it is a condition-setter and enabler for other mission essential
tasks.3 As such, a different process was necessary for Army
South to collectively expand the planning horizon and change
its focus from activities that would be executed in the next fiscal
year to producing a plan that presented long range goals that
partner nations could meet through focused and prioritized
assistance from the U.S. military.
Army South Security Cooperation Evolution
Military leaders direct their subordinates and organizations
through orders. Army South’s leadership empowered its staff to
take action in determining how to plan by individual country
in an objectives-driven method to nominate security cooperation activities.4 The challenge was determining how to design
a security cooperation planning process that included planners
from all staff directorates to build country focused security cooperation campai