long-run, conflicts that end in settlements are much
longer than those that end decisively, and thus ceteris
paribus might involve more deaths.34 Roughly 50 percent more people die per capita over the entire duration of wars that terminated in settlements than wars
with clear victors. Add to this consideration that if
a war recurs (which is more common in settlements
than in decisive victories), it tends to be increasingly
violent, killing combatants and civilians at a higher
rate.35
Despite these findings, the more detailed evidence
suggests that peacekeeping is not an outright worse
decision in terms of preventing deaths. Instead, much
depends on the mandate and composition of peacekeeping forces. With a proper mandate and sufficient
strength, peacekeepers may prevent the loss of life at
a relatively low cost, but whether these results extend
beyond the post-cold war experience of African civil
wars remains to be seen. Similarly, a relatively low
material cost36 may not always translate into the political will necessary for robust peacekeeping.
Democratization/Political Reform
A common feature in peacekeeping since the end
of the cold war has been the push for democratization.
Indeed, the majority of post-civil war agreements contain provisions for elections.37 In addition to a normative desire, often from a neoliberal perspective, for
these political reforms, studies suggest that democracy should help create room for cooperation and the
peaceful resolution of disagreements, even in the contentious political arena of post-war countries.38 Having a political alternative to violence is also linked to a
lower chance of conflict recurrence,39 but the record of
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