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(as opposed to a simple cease-fire) is reduced in the presence of peacekeepers.14 Thus, empirically, peacekeeping limits diplomatic initiatives and undermines their effectiveness when they do occur. Table 1: Peacekeeping and the Likelihood of Negotiation and Mediation Success No Peacekeeping Peacekeeping Successful Negotiation 43% (0.13) 31% (0.04) Successful Mediation 41% (0.06) 22% (0.03) Using data from Grieg and Diehl, we generate the predicted probabilities that negotiation or mediation will lead to an agreement based on the presence of peacekeeping.15 In a set of civil wars16 between 1946 and 1999, the probability of successful negotiation or mediation is always higher when peacekeepers are not involved (see Table 1). A civil war includes a successful negotiation in 43 percent of the cases when there is no peacekeeping presence, but drops to 31 percent when peacekeepers are involved. High variability in the estimate for negotiation success, however, means that we are uncertain about the negative effect of peacekeeping in this situation, but are confident that peacekeeping does not increase the prospects for negotiation success. Mediation is about half as likely to succeed when peacekeepers are present (22 percent) compared to when they are not (41 percent); this difference is statistically significant supporting the idea that peacekeeping hinders successful mediation. Overall, the net effect appears to be that peacekeeping actually diminishes the likelihood of diplomacy 7