perspective, allowing the fighting to continue is more
likely to produce a permanent end to the fighting and
a stable settlement in the long run.
What do we know from empirical findings that
could shed light on these competing perspectives?
Michael Greig and Paul Diehl lend support for the
pessimistic view of the peacekeeping-peacemaking relationship.12 In general, peacekeeping actually reduces
the occurrence of diplomatic efforts aimed at settling
conflicts. Among both interstate and civil conflicts,
when peacekeepers are deployed, the likelihood that
conflicting parties will attempt direct negotiations or
accept offers of mediation to help settle their conflict
was sharply reduced. Some of the most prominent
mediation successes, such as the Vatican-mediated
settlement of the Beagle Channel Dispute and the
U.S.-brokered Camp David Accords took place in the
absence of peacekeepers, with renewed peacekeeping
deployment between Israel and Egypt taking place
only after a peace settlement was in place.
Not only does the presence of peacekeepers reduce
the likelihood that mediation and negotiation efforts
will take place, but the on-the-ground performance of
peacekeepers in managing conflict also strongly influences the occurrence of diplomatic initiatives to settle
the conflict. When violence subsequently flares up,
even after peacekeepers are deployed, mediation and
negotiation become even less likely.13 For example,
failed peacekeeping efforts in Somalia only dampened
expectations among the warring parties, and indeed
within the international community as a whole, that
a diplomatic settlement of differences was possible.
Finally, Greig and Diehl report that even when diplomatic efforts do occur, the likelihood that mediation
and negotiation will lead to a settlement agreement
6