gards the deployment of peacekeepers as enhancing
peacemaking efforts.6 This line of thinking draws
heavily upon the idea that intense conflict makes the
prospects for diplomacy more difficult.7 According to
this rationale, as a conflict continues over time and the
warring sides experience intense fighting, peacemaking becomes more difficult because the parties grow
more psychologically committed to the conflict.8 As
this commitment deepens, each seeks to punish the
other side and achieve a return on their own sunk
costs from the conflict. In turn, even when conflicting parties might consider moving toward a peace
settlement as the costs of fighting grow unbearable,
severe violence serves to heighten the “the bargainer’s
dilemma” in which disputants fear that a willingness
to make concessions toward a peace agreement will be
interpreted as a signal of weakness and exploited by
their adversaries.
By establishing and maintaining a cease-fire among
the warring sides, peacekeepers supposedly create an
environment in which the psychological barriers to
settlement begin to diminish and the bargainer’s dilemma can be attenuated. A cooling off period can
lessen hostilities and build some trust between the
protagonists. In addition, according to this view, intense conflict puts domestic political constraints on
leaders who might otherwise be inclined to sign a
peace agreement. Consistent with these arguments,
former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
argues that peacekeeping “expands the