ceived legitimacy to the Syrian population than any entity currently outside Syrian borders , are not being leveraged sufficiently to offset this perception . The LCs do not respect the SNC . Other successor SNC efforts to produce a new Syrian government suffer from similar problems . None have managed to sufficiently involve local in-country parties either across horizontal sectarian lines , or vertical lines of sub-national authority and legitimacy . In Libya , four competing governments claim to be the legitimate national leaders . As Libyan society and politics views itself through the lens of tribal rather than national allegiance , these governments represent different tribal groupings rather than a truly national effort . Western efforts to choose one as the legitimate government without recognizing the power or the social implications of that lens , or the power structures that serve as glue within the society , are incorporating a fatal flaw .
Such locally-respected intermediaries exist in nearly every culture and context on earth — certainly , within countries such as Syria , Libya and Yemen . Depending on culture and nation they may be tribal , religious , clan or ethnicity-based , but their functions are similar — among which is to serve as intermediaries between local populations and State-level governance . Their presence and involvement in reconstruction and governance efforts is critical , 22 but it comes with several warnings . Leveraged unwisely , they can co-opt national government for their own uses , or themselves be co-opted . If these intermediaries are excluded , they can become extremely effective spoilers , or competing structures of authority . Numerous risks do exist , but these are outweighed by the nearcertain failure of any effort that simply neglects to consider them .
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