with security services — are a fundamental part of preventing the rise of violent extremism . 20 However , regardless of abuses from , or towards some quarters , indigenous militaries are also seen as “ our own ,” and certainly more so than any intervening force .
An honest , and above all transparent effort to incorporate those units and individuals that can be reformed should be made at the very least . Currently , efforts at Disarmament , Demobilization and Reintegration ( DDR ) tend to focus far more on the two Ds than on the R — the reintegration portion is historically the most difficult and least well-funded .
Members of the American military and Department of State reinforced this point recently at the second annual conference on Leveraging US Security Assistance in Support of Accountability for and Prevention of Human Rights Abuses , held at the United States Institute of Peace ( USIP ). 21 Brigadier General Mitchell Chitwood pointed out that there is a difference between individuals and institutions , and in his experience within the International Security Assistance Force ( ISAF ) mission in Afghanistan , even within “ bad ” institutions , there will still be individuals who can and want to promote change .
Local connections are particularly important — currently , the Syrian National Coalition ( SNC ), the first in a series of efforts to produce a post-Assad government for Syria , all too closely mirrors the “ hotel government ” that Ahmed Chalabi and the CPA put forward in 2003 . The bitter memory of that experience is not lost on either Syria or Iraq today . Local Councils ( LCs ) within Syria , which have significantly more per-
16