long and careful pre-planning is the only way to accomplish it — but there will be a balance to negotiate between traction and occupation .
Identify and use / reform what exists as much as possible , rather than attempting to replace it .
In Garner ’ s vision , the Iraqi military and civil government should be retained , not only are those as institutions critical to maintaining security and properly functioning civil society , but also to prevent widespread unemployment of still-armed security forces , which could be a recipe for disaster . Experience tells us that these two elements cannot be replaced or imposed for very long from external sources . Bremer ’ s perception for dismantling the Iraqi military was that as an institution , it was fatally tainted by its use as a tool of repression and its treatment of the Iraqi people over decades under Saddam Hussein ’ s rule . Tainted perhaps — but not fatally .
Militaries are no different than other government institutions in that neither they nor the populations they ( ostensibly ) serve , perceive them in unitary , monolithic terms . To be sure , where there have been long-term and widespread abuses by the security forces , some units and individuals must not be allowed to continue service . The Leahy Law , 19 which prohibits international assistance to individuals and units accused of human rights violations , would rightly prohibit American use of , or assistance to such units regardless of any desire to turn a blind eye . Turning a blind eye would be a mistake regardless , as human rights and good governance — which populations experience largely through their relationship
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