Duration of operations
Garner has opined that if he had even as little as another 120 days 18 to implement the plans that he was beginning to put in motion , the outcome in Iraq could have been quite different . There is no evidence to suggest that this amount of additional time would have been enough to produce success . On the contrary , there is overwhelming evidence that even the longer 18-month timeline suggested elsewhere by Secretary of State Kerry would have been at best wildly optimistic , and at worst actually dangerous .
The difference is that General Garner focused his timeline on what it would take to get traction on the processes that could eventually produce a stable peace , rather than suggesting this is the time it would take to produce peace . This is a critical nuance , and it is arguable that the additional time could have both shortened the duration of US involvement and smoothed a quicker transition towards a more resilient goal .
What both Garner ’ s ORHA and Bremer ’ s CPA agreed on in principle , if not in mechanics , was that any occupation should be short . What Bremer appeared to mean by this is that it wouldn ’ t need to be long ; what Garner meant by it is that intervention forces would be initially welcomed , but that it would take very little time for liberator to become occupier in the Iraqi mind . Future planners should take note of the difference between these two interpretations , and that every historical example we have available tells us that “ short reconstruction ” is an oxymoron . As much as the duration of operations can be reduced ,
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