planning , as well as the existing body of analysis . 14 This is highlighted in instances such as the “ realitybased community ” 15 comment made to journalist Ron Suskind in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion . In such a conception , planning would of course not be necessary , and it is this reasoning which guided the hand of Paul Bremer and the CPA .
This flies in the face of a large and growing body of research on the success rates of implanted democracy . The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction ( SIGIR ) assessment ’ s 16 indicated that among the core causes of failure in Iraq was the lack of pre-agreed structures of accountability , reporting and responsibility among the various American and coalition entities . Even given the advance planning afforded the post-war occupation that later became the Marshall Plan , it was not announced as such until June of 1947 . It took until April of 1948 — nearly three additional years after the end of World War Two and more than seven years after planning began — for the Plan to be put into practice .
Even had there been a plan based on sound historical analysis as opposed to ideological assumptions , the process of reconstruction is exceedingly complex and requires more flexibility than rigidity . The Marshall Plan ’ s second-in-command , Harlan Cleveland , called it “ a series of improvisations … a continuous international happening .” 17 No easy or universal roadmap exists for navigating that kind of complexity — but planning and operations will start on an improved footing if we recognize that complexity is inevitable from the outset and proceed accordingly .
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