Bremer further pointed out that much of the military personnel vanished rapidly following the fall of Baghdad , and thus “ there was no military to employ .” 23 Garner countered this by arguing that while technically true , many had reappeared and could have been brought back . 24 The experience of Iraq shows us how quickly disenfranchised , unemployed and still armed soldiers can form the nucleus of insurgency . It is not , sadly , the only example . 25
The ultimate truth of the Iraq example will never be known , since no attempt was made to re-employ the vanished soldiers . We do however have a reasonably clear understanding of where those soldiers went and what the cost was in Iraqi and Coalition lives . 26 Whether or not the attempt would be completely successful , any increase in trained indigenous forces and resulting reduction of those available to become fighters of another sort represents a positive advance .
Any urge to isolate or purge politically tainted civil government should be treated with the same skeptical eye . To be sure , efforts should be made to ensure that there is no fifth column left behind the fall of an autocrat , with the power to cause damage to ongoing operations . However , those with necessary knowledge and experience who wish to stay and assist in the formation of new civil structures should be encouraged to do so . Their assistance and institutional knowledge ( over and above technical knowledge ) is invaluable , as is the statement that governance is local rather than foreign .
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