A final example of common errors is the idea that interventions directed towards reconstruction and reform of governance must focus on the creation of democratic institutions and a functioning multi-party government . Hard-earned experience tells us that elections 6 held within heavily divided societies tend to worsen factional frictions rather than alleviating them . In countries where such interventions are necessary , the social capacity to carry out the contest of multi-party elections peacefully is usually absent .
Even locally-led efforts are not immune to failure . In 2012 , the US Institute of Peace convened a project called the Day After . 7 This was billed as an indigenously led and designed process — by Syrians , for Syrians — to formulate a post-Assad plan for security and governance in Syria . However it was designed , the resulting report described a near-textbook plan for instituting liberal Jeffersonian democratic governance in Damascus . Not only does this report read as though it was written by US Agencies as opposed to Syrians , but we lack even a single historical example of successfully implanting such a government without ( as there was in post-World War II Europe ) any significant prior history of a power-sharing democratic governance . In fact , the past nine years have seen an unbroken downward slide in the strength of democratic governance worldwide . 8
Existing plans tend to gloss over the inevitable effects of a shattered and factionalized polity on the timeline for democratic governance and stability . “ The Day After ” report , for example , makes only vestigial reference to sub-national customary forms of author-
9