ity which permeate every level of Syrian society , and are the one mechanism of governance that Syrians tend to trust . 9 – These sub-national authorities must be treated with great caution , as they tend to become spoilers when not incorporated , or often compete for authority if poorly incorporated into the governance structure . Libya is another perfect — if tragic — example of this , where an inter-tribal struggle for political power has shattered the brief calm that followed Qaddafi ’ s fall .
What is known is that planning for reconstruction — let alone implementing those plans — and mitigating the risks of conflict recurrence , is a long and complicated process that requires years rather than months . The one-size-fits-all approach has repeatedly been shown not to work . 10 The design of the Marshall Plan for post- World War II reconstruction , for example , was begun at the dawn of 1942 , immediately after the American entrance into the war . Planning began then on the assumption that if we won , we ’ d need it ; and we ’ d need as long as possible to put it together . Attempting to plan on the fly in Iraq on the assumption that we wouldn ’ t need it was a terrible error . 11
Although checklists and one-size-fits-all may tend to fail , we can , and should identify and consider a series of points in the contrast between ORHA ’ s plans , the CPA ’ s implementation and the benefit of hindsight . We can then apply these as a set of principles rather than as a checklist of activities . If not sufficient to create success , these principles cannot be forgotten because they are sufficient in their absence to create failure . For the most part , the reader will
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