to a series of American approaches , differing subtly or radically depending upon which office they originated within , and in which country they operate .
In short , it appears that little planning for “ what happens afterwards ” in Syria or any of the other countries listed above has taken shape at all . When long term planning has occurred , evidence suggests a tactical outlook with a worrisome lack of strategy , and persistent retention of a number of un-learned lessons and demonstrably incorrect assumptions . First and foremost among these is a simple template which can be learned and then applied in all future situations . As in the quotation that heads this section , “ there were no coherent plans for establishing governance , providing security or restoring public services ” in Iraq — the inference is that if we build a government , provide security and restore services , all will be well . All of these are of course important , and all of them are deceptively simple , because it is how they are decided upon , how they are implemented and whether or not the society is able to incorporate the changes peacefully and equitably that makes a far more critical difference than simply whether they exist or not .
Another common error is the timeline , for example , in mid-November of 2015 , Secretary of State Kerry announced a plan for transition in Syria , whereby UN-monitored elections would follow Assad ’ s removal within 18 months . 4 This plan vanished only a month later under pressure from Russia . 5 Even had it remained in place as it stood , however , numerous historical examples tell us that an eighteen- month timeframe would be recklessly short and likely to cause more problems than it solves .
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