that would support stability during the transition to a new civil government were precluded by the CPA ’ s General Order Number Two , which disbanded the Army entirely . Before any of ORHAs plans and priorities could be put into meaningful practice , in fact , they were countermanded , shelved or dismantled . Iraq ’ s subsequent descent into violence is well-documented , as are the ramifications of the two General Orders .
In the aftermath and historical examination of the failures of the Iraq mission , core American doctrinal principles changed significantly . Concepts like statebuilding have been marginalized , and concepts like resilience and fragility have taken center stage . Stabilization and reconstruction are often tarred by their association with the corruption , waste and misuse of money spent on thus-titled programming in Iraq and Afghanistan . Overall , the role of stabilization has shifted from being a strategic goal to being a specific and critical sub-section to a larger and more comprehensive effort . Of significant note , intervention structures are beginning to recognize ( if not yet sufficiently ) that the host government ’ s motives and intentions , as well as its absorptive capacities for change need to be added into the planning calculus . In a series of interviews done by the author on this subject , one USAID respondent replied , “ We think surgically and assume that the government is a willing partner . Surgical [ stabilization ] programs won ’ t change the fundamental problem of exclusionary governance — our first question should be whether host country policies will undermine the work .”
The loose pattern of surgical tactical efforts combined with variations on strategic distance persists
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