despite these changes . Far from the regime-changeand-occupation model of Iraq or Afghanistan , the 2011 American efforts in Libya focused on removing Qaddafi through direct action with air power alone , but left reconstruction and development largely to European powers . In Syria , ongoing Western efforts to oust Assad and defeat ISIS alike have been limited to airstrikes and the provision of trainers and advisors to local combatant groups . Diplomatic efforts to secure Assad ’ s ouster have been hobbled by competing efforts to keep him and his government in power .
In Yemen , the American approach has been even more hands-off , devoted to diplomatic support for the government in exile and material support to a coalition of Gulf States engaged in the actual combat . In Africa , we tend to see an even lighter touch — Special Operations troops fielded to limited engagements against specific targets ; legal sanctions against specific individuals or groups ; strong humanitarian aid provision and support for high-level peace processes . The increasing competition between regional and international interests across the Middle East introduced a proxy war dynamic that was not present to nearly the same degree in 2003 .
Overall , it can be argued — and is often the local perception — that the level and intensity of American involvement tends to correlate more with our own national security interests rather than an objective analysis of need . While there is an element of self-interest in any intervention by definition , the tipping point comes when the actions of the intervener are perceived to bring harm to the local population or to prioritize other lives over their own . This consideration needs
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