which resulted in a 1,300-page volume that contained a thorough analysis of Iraqi social schisms and political pressures and the likely drivers of violence — a tragically accurate analysis , as it bore out . General Garner was aware of the report and its conclusions at the time he was asked to form ORHA , 3 and requested that members of the Future of Iraq team be seconded to ORHA , but his requests were denied . This kind of lead agency power struggle is common across all US whole-of-government approaches .
Nevertheless , ORHA was intended to be a fusion cell , bringing together the planning capabilities and operational minds from across the spectrum of agencies and actors . From the beginning , however , the team was plagued by a lack of funding , resources and authority . The job was pressed for time — Garner was acutely aware that his team had at best a matter of months to create plans that in historical examples had taken years to produce . Increasingly the team was also aware that the Pentagon was dismissive of the idea that advance planning was needed at all .
Two months after General Garner accepted the ORHA mission , the US invaded Iraq on March 20 , 2003 . A month after the ORHA team ’ s April arrival in Baghdad , General Garner was removed from his role along with the whole of ORHA , and replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority ( CPA ) under L . Paul Bremer . ORHA ’ s plans to find and hire former government employees who could assist in the reconstruction were precluded by the implementation of the CPA ’ s General Order Number One , de- Ba ’ athification of the government . Plans to incorporate as much of the Iraqi Army as possible into a new force
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