and it is unlikely that we will see another planned or implemented the same way .
Despite that , there are still critical lessons to be gained which can help to improve the inevitable future interventions . Those interventions will not be duplicates of Iraq , neither will they be a one-size-fits-all approach nor a checklist mentality . This monograph will seek to examine the differences between the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance ( ORHA ) and the Coalition Provisional Authority ( CPA ), each of which had authority over the design and mindset of the Iraq mission , with the goal of identifying lessons about processes , if not content .
Past is prologue
The first American effort at post-war reconstruction in Iraq was ORHA under retired General Jay Garner . In January 2003 , Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith , on behalf of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld contacted Garner about assuming the ORHA mission . He was asked to undertake the formation of a group that would draw up plans for post-war reconstruction of Iraq “ should there be a war .” 1
To some degree , planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq had already begun , but within disassociated offices and with little to no horizontal integration . Most problematically , serious efforts to understand Iraq ’ s history and current state and provide that analysis to potential planners had already been carried out , but that analysis was never incorporated into any planning structures . The Department of State had undertaken the Future of Iraq project in 2001 , 2
3