Military Review English Edition September-October 2016 | Page 12

the United States to continue to contribute to regional
stability as well as sustain its influence and interests in
northeast Asia.
It is unlikely that, in terms of personnel and quantity of materiel, the ROK and U.S. militaries will have
sufficient capabilities on hand and pre-positioned to
deal with a North Korean collapse or reunification.2
However, based on experience, doctrine, and extant
capabilities, the U.S. military can make a potent contribution to a ROK-led preparation-centric strategy. As
the Army Operating Concept explains, as a member of
the joint force, the Army has well-developed capabilities for establishing stable environments in postconflict
or failed-state environments, consolidating gains, and
achieving sustainable outcomes.3 The U.S. Army’s efforts
to enhance the performance of its soldiers and civilians
in confronting complexity position it well to succeed in
preparing for or executing operations in a North Korean
collapse. From the foundation of a ROK-led preparation-centric strategy, the U.S. military can play a powerful, albeit supporting, role in stabilizing North Korea.

Contextualizing and Bounding
the Problems
The DPRK’s problems are many and varied, but
most are knowable and will have to be dealt with
eventually, whether because of war, regime collapse,
or peaceful reunification. Analysts focusing on North
Korea can produce a catalog of challenges and opportunities associated with North Korean collapse
or reunification.4 That catalog, in turn, can provide
government agencies with a framework from which
to create solutions to challenges and methods to take
advantage of opportunities in the pursuit of objectives,
including establishing a durable peace on the peninsula,
denuclearization, and regional stability.
There is a growing body of work useful for assessing
issues associated with the DPRK’s instability and potential collapse, as well as references that provide structured
approaches to active preparation and, if necessary, a
positive respon se to those events.5 U.S. Army doctrine,
drawing on extensive stability operations experience,
offers a framework against which to apply analysis and
preparation, and upon which we can layer area-specific
expertise.6 U.S. scholarship and unclassified government
analysis of the subject matter are a relatively recent development and provide critical country-specific context
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to layer onto U.S. Army doctrine and experience.7
Collectively, the work referenced above is invaluable in
understanding the context of potential regime collapse
in the DPRK or reunification of the two Koreas, and
correspondingly, for designing and executing a strategy
to prepare for these potentialities.

“7P” Strategy

A “7P” strategy—politics, public (support), prediction
(assessment), policy, plans, preparation, and prompting
(shaping)—best positions the U.S.-ROK alliance to stabilize North Korea and set conditions to enable reunification and reintegration.8 All seven Ps are critical, but this
article focuses on policy and preparation. Collectively,
the other Ps can be used to prompt positive, and hopefully stable, change in North Korea.9
The 7P strategy does not advocate or require efforts to
bring down the Kim family regime. Rather, this strategy is
designed primarily to enable rapid, effective, and efficient
stabilization, and potentially reunification, in the event of
a collapse crisis that originates internally in North Korea.
However, perhaps the 7P strategy could encourage, or
enable, the Kim family regime to implement changes that
reduce the threat they present to their neighbors and
enhance the well-being of their own people.

Politics and Public Support
Concerted efforts are required in both the United
States and the ROK to build understanding and support
for a campaign to stabilize North Korea in the event of
collapse. In the ROK, support for reunification is eroding. Other than with Koreans in their fifties and older,
there is not significant support in any strata of ROK
society to pay the costs required to achieve reunification,
let alone to make advance investments through taxes or
other material measures to offset reunification costs.10
Responding to changing perspectives in ROK society,
President Park Geun-hye is working to build a consensus
on reunification.11 Indications from focus groups are that
her administration’s efforts have arrested the decline in
support for reunification and sparked a broader dialogue
on the issue.12 However, national consensus remains
elusive; it is trending toward acceptance of continued
division or perhaps a future federation. More is required
to sustain, enhance, and ultimately transition a societal
dialogue into tangible support for active preparation for
collapse or reunification, which, depending on North
September-October 2016  MILITARY REVIEW