Military Review English Edition September-October 2016 | Seite 13

KOREA

Young people from a collective farm in North Korea harvest crops 30 October 2012. Autumn rains had soaked the crops, which may have
made them difficult to store. Citizens of North Korea continually face famine, exacerbated by the country’s “military first” policy. (Photo by
Devrig Velly, European Union)

Korea, may not come about in a manner that offers a
choice to the ROK other than direct involvement.13
The U.S. public presents a tougher challenge in terms
of its willingness to support stabilization of North Korea
in the event of regime collapse or to support reunification. Americans would likely be reluctant to support a
fight against remnants of the DPRK’s military to bring
about stability or reunification. In order to draw support,
the U.S. government would be well served to provide the
American people with a compelling explanation about
the U.S. interests at stake in the event of regime collapse
or reunification, to include the need to gain control over
the DPRK’s WMD.

From Prediction to Assessment
We must transcend the tendency to predict the
fate of the Kim regime, to assess, instead, the requirements for stabilizing North Korea should its regime
collapse, and for setting the conditions for reunification. For more than two decades, since the death of
Kim Il-sung, Korea watchers focused on predicting
the DPRK’s collapse at the expense of a disciplined
MILITARY REVIEW  September-October 2016

consideration of the preparation necessary to respond
to North Korean instability, let alone reunification
and reintegration. Beginning with the death of Kim
Il-sung, the focus on collapse intensified at key inflection points, including the first North Korean nuclear
crisis and famine. The result has been a twenty-year
analytic wandering; analysts tend to admire the
problem and mystery that is North Korea rather than
considering how to make progress in pursuing national interests, or, more nobly, how to bring relief to the
long-suffering North Korean people.
With Kim Jong-un effectively wielding power, the
cottage industry of predicting North Korea’s collapse
adjusted its business model. Analysis now centers
on new areas such as power consolidation and relationships among North Korean elites.14 Rather than
predicting the precise timing and circumstances of the
Kim regime’s demise, most are content to assess that
the Kim regime cannot last forever.15 This shift has
facilitated thought on responding to instability, not just
predicting it. This shift in turn is rendering analytically
robust frameworks useful for actual preparation. 16
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