Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 98

disagreements, treating them like pockets of resistance to be tackled at the end, and circling back only
to engage after sufficient momentum is achieved.
All of this takes place against the backdrop of the
MRsSPEA framework. During the execution of the
meeting, the commander is mindful of the social factors because without them he jeopardizes the successful attainment of the objectives.

Conclusion
While the MRsSPEA framework is an analytical
tool for drawing attention to the social factors of the

human domain, like the other mnemonic devices
(SWEAT-MSO, OAKOC, and ASCOPE), it is only as
good as its inputs. Society and the roles that individuals play in it change constantly. Hence, every attempt
to harness MRsSPEA as a tool for increasing shared
understanding and facilitating mission command
depends on having the most up-to-date information
about the particular aspects of the human domain.
Ultimately, as a subset of PMESII-PT, MRsSPEA
offers commanders and staff a better way to apply
mission command in order to realize decisive action
in any operational environment and win.

Biography
Maj. Brian Hildebrand, a full-time member of the Texas Army National Guard, is the executive officer of 1st
Battalion, 133rd Field Artillery Regiment, in Houston, Texas. He holds a BA from the University of Saint
Thomas and an MS from Norwich University. He has deployed twice in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and
he recently returned from deployment to Egypt as part of 1-112 Cavalry Squadron USBATT 60, Multinational
Forces and Observer Mission.

Notes
1. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0,
Mission Command (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office [GPO], May 2012).
2. Raymond T. Odierno, James F. Amos, and William H.
McRaven, Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills,
Strategic Landpower Task Force White Paper, 2013, 5,
accessed 20 January 2016, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/Strategic%20Landpower%20White%20
Paper.pdf.
3. Andrew Whitford, “The Path to Mission Command,”
Military Review 95(3) (May–June 2015): 40, accessed 8 March
2016, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/
English/MilitaryReview_20150630_art011.pdf.
4. Mark Herbert, “The Human Domain: The Army’s
Necessary Push to Toward Squishiness,” Military Review 94(5)
(September–October 2014): 81–87, accessed 8 March 2016,
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/
MilitaryReview_20141031_art014.pdf.
5. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 28.
6. John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (1939; repr., New
York: Prometheus Books, 1989), 2.
7. Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook for
an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations (Suffolk, VA:

96

U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, February
2006).
8. Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S.
GPO, February 2008). This manual has been superseded by
ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations.
9. Army Doctrine Publication 5-0, The Operations Process
(Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, May 2012), 8. Step 1 of the military decision making process is “Receipt of mission,” and step 2
is “Mission analysis.”
10. ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC:
U.S. GPO, May 2012), 1-7. The acronym PMESII-PT stands for
political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information,
physical environment, and time. METT-TC stands for mission,
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, and civil considerations. Respectively, the terms in
each acronym describe operational and mission factors used
during analysis by commanders and staffs to gain situational
understanding.
11. Information used in the example regarding Egypt is taken from “Egypt—Language, Culture, Customs and Etiquette,”
Kwintessential website, accessed 20 January 2016, http://www.
kwintessential.co.uk/resources/global-etiquette/egypt-country-profile.html.
12. Whitford, “The Path to Mission Command,” 42.

May-June 2016  MILITARY REVIEW