Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 88

noted in 1950, “It is axiomatic that any weapon of
war is best suited for the purpose for which it has
been produced.”33 Technology cannot solve these
dilemmas; it can only provide enhancing tools.
However, there is a point of diminishing returns:
“Comparing fighter-bombers of both periods, it turns
out that a Stuka was quite as capable of knocking out a
World War II tank as an A-10 Warthog is of doing the
same to a present-day one. Similarly, P-47s in 1944–
1945 did not take many more sorties to bring down a
bridge or hit a locomotive than an F-16 did six-and-ahalf decades later.”34 However, the cost of an F-16 today
is orders of magnitude higher than was for those aircrafts
that effectively performed the missions previously.35
Consequently, CAS is a need the Army must develop organically, as the services cannot overcome “the
barriers that prevent troops from receiving the realistic,
standardized training” required.36 Present, MRAs provide only some capabilities needed by ground forces. It
is true that jets can be responsive, can carry significant
ordnance, and are survivable against both high- and
low-order threats. On the other hand, the displacement
of air units from ground units and the speed of jets necessitate relatively restrictive employment procedures

as opposed to the flexible, less formal methods used by
Army Aviation.37
The Army should fill the gap between its helicopters and USAF CAS with its own FW attack aircraft.
A turboprop aircraft within the CAB seems the
best location for such an aircraft. Fielding this type
of aircraft would augment USAF CAS, providing a
responsive, capable attack platform to the Army for
a relatively low cost. This transition could allow the
Army CAB to support joint efforts, should the Army
pass excess sorties to the joint force commander in
the same way as Marine Corps aviation.38
In the absence of significant USAF allocations
during active operations, Army commanders will
turn to what organic aviation assets they have at
their disposal, which at present are primarily Army
aviation helicopters. However, Army commanders
need the capability and flexibility that FW aircraft
provide such as speed, loiter time, and altitude-based
survivability. Additionally, the institutional Army
will appreciate the low procurement and operational
cost of such an aircraft. Combining the advantages of
a FW turboprop with the proven capability of Army
helicopters is the ideal solution.

Biography
Maj. John Q. Bolton is a student at the Defense Language Institute-Monterey (Chinese) as an Olmsted Scholar. His
previous assignment was as a student at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, where
he received the George C. Marshall Award. He holds a BS in mechanical engineering from the United States Military
Academy, an MBA from American Military University, and a MMAS from the CGSC. An Army aviator (AH64D/E), his assignments include multiple deployments during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

Notes
1. Robert A. Pape, “The True Worth of Air Power,” Foreign
Affairs 83(2) (March–April 2004): 116–30.
2. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO],
May 2012), 1-14–1-15.
3. Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, Brigade Combat Team (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2010), 1-10.
4. I.B. Holley Jr., “A Retrospect on Close Air Support,” in Case
Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin
Cooling (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 538.

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5. Edward Weber, “The Future of Fixed-Wing Close Air Support: Does the Army Need It to Fight?” (master’s thesis, Army
Command and General Staff College [CGSC], 1998), 8.
6. Robert Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB, AL:
Air University, 1974).
7. RAND Corporation, “Do Joint Fighter Programs Save Money?” by Mark A. Lorell, Michael Kennedy, Robert S. Leonard,
Ken Munson, Shmuel Abramzon, David L. An, and Robert A.
Guffey (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 39–40.

May-June 2016  MILITARY REVIEW