Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 86

$250 Cost to Buy and Fly 5,000 Hours $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ F-15E F-35 Million $200 $150 $100 $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ AT-6 AH-64E A-10 F-16 $50 $0 $ (Source: see note 28) Figure 2. Total Ownership Costs per Aircraft (2014 Dollars) Though joint operations over the last ten years have alleviated some of this gap—USAF liaison squadrons are not co-located with Army divisions—it will always exist between different services. Army reliance on USAF CAS contradicts numerous principles of war, most specifically unity of command; the commander performing a mission should control all the tools directly required for success. At the tactical level, this implies control. If the Army is to be “decisive” in land operations, it should not artificially restrict its means. Since Army doctrine recognizes the need for FW CAS, in addition to Army aviation, it follows that the Army should own and control the assets for the mission. The Army needs an aircraft designed for the CAS mission its doctrine describes as critical. Hellfire Missile and GBU-series GPS guided bombs.26 Moreover, turboprops can loiter for upwards of five hours, land on short runways or dirt strips, and provide precision fires. Compared to USAF jets and Army helicopters, turboprops are inexpensive; an entire twenty-four aircraft squadron of AT-6s, for example, would cost less than a single F-35A or slightly more than two F-15Es. In a single, three-hour mission typical of those seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, an Army turboprop saves nearly $18,000 over an Army AH-64E, and nearly $88,000 over the F-35A. Light attack turbo props can perform the “bomb truck” mission the U.S. Army needs.27 Figures 1 (page 83) and 2 demonstrate the cost savings provided by these type of aircrafts.28 An Army CAS Solution Conditions under which CAS Operate Modern turboprop aircraft offer a solution to fill capability gap described above by providing the ideal mix of cost and capabilities. Turboprops like the Beechcraft AT-6 are fast enough to move quickly across a theater, but operate at slower speeds conducive to target acquisition for long periods once at the objective. They also have the avionics and modern sensors found on advanced aircraft and employ common precision weapons like the AGM-114 Even in situations with a significant enemy air defense or aircraft threat, which is the USAF’s primary tactical responsibility, Air Force CAS doctrine assumes air superiority as a prerequisite condition for conducting operations.29 Likewise, the obvious vulnerability of Army CAS aircraft from enemy aircraft not neutralized must also assume air superiority as a precondition for successful support of troops on the ground. Such an assumption allows for an aircraft 84 May-June 2016  MILITARY REVIEW