Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 86
$250
Cost to Buy and Fly 5,000 Hours
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
F-15E
F-35
Million
$200
$150
$100
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
AT-6
AH-64E
A-10
F-16
$50
$0
$
(Source: see note 28)
Figure 2. Total Ownership Costs per Aircraft (2014 Dollars)
Though joint operations over the last ten years have
alleviated some of this gap—USAF liaison squadrons are not co-located with Army divisions—it will
always exist between different services.
Army reliance on USAF CAS contradicts numerous principles of war, most specifically unity of
command; the commander performing a mission
should control all the tools directly required for success. At the tactical level, this implies control. If the
Army is to be “decisive” in land operations, it should
not artificially restrict its means. Since Army doctrine
recognizes the need for FW CAS, in addition to Army
aviation, it follows that the Army should own and
control the assets for the mission. The Army needs
an aircraft designed for the CAS mission its doctrine
describes as critical.
Hellfire Missile and GBU-series GPS guided bombs.26
Moreover, turboprops can loiter for upwards of
five hours, land on short runways or dirt strips, and
provide precision fires. Compared to USAF jets and
Army helicopters, turboprops are inexpensive; an
entire twenty-four aircraft squadron of AT-6s, for example, would cost less than a single F-35A or slightly
more than two F-15Es.
In a single, three-hour mission typical of those
seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, an Army turboprop
saves nearly $18,000 over an Army AH-64E, and
nearly $88,000 over the F-35A. Light attack turbo
props can perform the “bomb truck” mission the U.S.
Army needs.27 Figures 1 (page 83) and 2 demonstrate
the cost savings provided by these type of aircrafts.28
An Army CAS Solution
Conditions under which CAS
Operate
Modern turboprop aircraft offer a solution to
fill capability gap described above by providing the
ideal mix of cost and capabilities. Turboprops like
the Beechcraft AT-6 are fast enough to move quickly
across a theater, but operate at slower speeds conducive to target acquisition for long periods once at
the objective. They also have the avionics and modern sensors found on advanced aircraft and employ
common precision weapons like the AGM-114
Even in situations with a significant enemy air
defense or aircraft threat, which is the USAF’s primary tactical responsibility, Air Force CAS doctrine
assumes air superiority as a prerequisite condition for
conducting operations.29 Likewise, the obvious vulnerability of Army CAS aircraft from enemy aircraft
not neutralized must also assume air superiority as a
precondition for successful support of troops on the
ground. Such an assumption allows for an aircraft
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May-June 2016 MILITARY REVIEW