Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 85

ARMY AIRCRAFT

$25
$20

Thousand

$15
$10
$5
$

A-10C

F-15E

F-16C
Air Force

F35A

AC-130 H/U

AH-64D/E
Army Rotary
Wing

AT-6C
Other
(Source: see note 28)

Figure 1. Hourly Operating Cost of Various Attack Aircraft
like the current Army combat aviation brigade (CAB),
and unlike modern USAF doctrine, TAC operations
were “planned, discussed, and arranged together.”23

A Comparison to Army Aviation
The effectiveness demonstrated by the Third Army
and XIX TAC set the precedent for the modern Army
CAB, which provides a similar level of support and
integration with ground units. Because of the organic
chain of command, close proximity, and mutual understanding enabled by the current Army division-CAB
task organization, Army aviators are able to tailor and
employ air power to best suit the ground force’s needs.
Comparing the doctrinal missions and organization of the TACs and CABs illustrates the similarities. Though the CAB and TAC organizations are different in scale and scope, their relationship to ground
forces, and cooperation are very similar.24 In fact, the
CAB performs missions other than attack and reconnaissance, such as air movement, air assault, as well
as medical evacuation.
Regarding air support, the CAB uses similar procedures as those used by the TAC. Its close proximity and
regular working relationship with ground units promote unity of command and a common understanding
MILITARY REVIEW  May-June 2016

of the operating environment as the CAB is simply
closer to the point of need. Since Army helicopters do
not require improved sites or long runways, they can
locate forward with ground units. However, the USAF,
with very limited exceptions, has not placed aircraft
forward at austere sites since Korea. While USAF
aircraft can mitigate distance somewhat through speed,
nothing is as effective at creating situational awareness
as proximity to events. Since Army aircraft operate
forward, they inherently have this trait, along with
traditional air power characteristics such as flexibility,
responsiveness, and firepower. As a result, the Army
aviation’s organization and operational frameworks
could easily accommodate a FW attack aircraft.

Assuming Air Superiority While
Limiting Costs
In addition to the USAF’s institutional aversion to
CAS and the escalating cost of aircraft, another factor
will undoubtedly limit USAF CAS: lack of interservice
cooperation. Since the USAF has consistently demonstrated that it believes CAS is “a lower-priority mission
or less effective use of air power than interdiction or
strategic bombardment,” the Army makes little effort
to conduct CAS training with USAF squadrons while
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