Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 84

issues were eventually rectified when the USAF pushed
dictated.”16 As the Third Army advanced, Weyland
controllers forward and deployed non-jet aircraft for
moved his headquarters frequently to keep up. At
12
CAS. However, the situation replicated itself early in
one point in late August 1944, XIX TAC had four
Vietnam, which eventually saw the emergence of platseparate elements spread across northern France in
forms such as the AC-47 gunship, OV-10 Bronco, and,
order to coordinate its subordinate units operating
most significantly, the epochal arrival of the helicopter.
from a dozen different airfields.17 That month, XIX
In Korea, Vietnam,
TAC moved seven times,
and, to a lesser extent,
totaling nearly 250 miles.18
Iraq and Afghanistan,
The frequent movements
the Air Force was
demonstrated that Weyland
for ced to adopt proceunderstood his headquardures and aircraft it did
ters needed proximity to
not particularly care
the ground commander
for, such as the A-10,
in order to facilitate close
AC-130, and OV-10.
cooperation and mutual
By 1991, the emerunderstanding between
gence of Army aviation
ground and air units.
mitigated much of the
Because of the close coArmy-Air Force conoperation between the Third
flict, although Army
Army and XIX TAC, proaviation remained limcedures for requesting and
ited to helicopters; this
controlling air support were
created a significant
streamlined and integrated
capability gap.
into operations.19 Weyland
History offers an
detached pilots to accomexample of effective
pany each armored column
Army-Air Force coopcommander to “advise him
eration from Northern
concerning the capabilities of
Europe during World
air and how to bring aircraft
(Image courtesy of the U.S. Air Force)
War II. Based on
onto their targets.”20 Because
Gen. George S. Patton and Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland, 1944, in
mutual understandof this emphasis on personal
Nancy, France, where the Third Army headquarters and XIX Tactiing and close proxcommunication and close
cal Air Command advance headquarters were stationed.
imity, Gen. George
proximity to maneuver
Patton’s Third Army and Brig. Gen. Otto Weyland’s
staffs, air and ground units effectively coordinated their
XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), espoused close
actions. As the American air-ground cooperation rapidly
cooperation and forged a capable team. Though some
improved, one Wehrmacht division commander bitterly
Air Force (then Army Air Corps) officers used doccharacterized the employment of U.S. tactical aircraft
trine to demand coequal status with ground forces, to
and artillery as “excellent.”21 Because of the relentless
Weyland it was merely a starting point for developing
pursuit of the fighter-bombers, many Germans soldiers
solutions appropriate to each situation.13 Weyland
developed what they called, “the German look,” head
14
embraced his role as “a tactical airpower expert.”
turned skyward looking for the next fighter-bomber
Weyland had spent most of his career in tactical opcoming in to attack.22
erations and consequently understood “ground forces
The close proximity of XIX TAC and Third Army
forwards and backwards.”15
headquarters also allowed for bottom-up refinement of
To support Patton, “Weyland threw away the air
operational plans as well as habitual relationships bepower book, decentralizing operations, delegating
tween air and ground units below command levels, often
command, [and] dispersing assets as the situation
down to the regimental (brigade) level. Furthermore,
82

May-June 2016  MILITARY REVIEW