Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 83

ARMY AIRCRAFT
An aircraft such
as the Beechcraft
AT-6 light attack
aircraft could
provide the U.S.
Army with a cost
-effective, highly
capable platform
to augment its
close air support
needs. The
aircraft can carry
a wide array of
U.S. and NATO
munitions.

(Photo by John Voo, Flickr)

Army helicopters routinely work with USAF ground
and air controllers without issue, often above the coordinating altitude. So would an Army FW attack aircraft
doing the same tasks be any different?
At the tactical level, the Army requires an aircraft
able to bridge the capability gap between its helicopters
and USAF jets. FW aircraft offer great advantages over
helicopters in terms of speed, loiter time, and cost. So,
given the historic USAF aversion to CAS and contemporary budget constraints, exacerbated by an impending loss of USAF capabilities with the retirement of
the A-10, the Army requires a new approach if it is to
enjoy uninterrupted CAS to ground forces in the future.
Simply, if CAS is an essential element of combined arms
maneuver—which it is according to Army doctrine—the
Army should have organic FW attack aircraft in order to
provide the full spectrum of aviation support.
Additionally, fielding such aircraft would free the
USAF to focus on its broader and institutionally preferred missions such as air superiority/interdiction/
global strike. An Army FW attack aircraft would enhance Army capabilities against low-end threats, leaving the Air Force to focus on high-threat environments.
This is the high-risk, low-probability scenario that dictates the design of USAF aircraft. Consequently, only
the A-10 (retiring) and AC-130 (limited) are designed
MILITARY REVIEW  May-June 2016

explicitly for CAS. Other USAF aircraft are neither
designed for, nor cost-effective in, the CAS role.
An Army FW CAS aircraft would have no such
limitations. Ironically, the USAF high-tech scenario,
while a threat, does not represent the overwhelming
majority of American conflicts; in other words, an
Army aircraft would be an 80 percent solution 95
percent of the time. Air Force MRA are a 100 percent
solution 5 percent of the time.

Third Army and XIX Tactical Air
Command
While the reduction of CAS capability in the
USAF—due to the aforementioned decrease in the
number of aircraft and the high cost of new aircraft
not specifically developed for CAS—is undesirable,
it is not without precedent. After acknowledging the
effectiveness of tactical air forces during World War II,
the USAF proceeded to disregard support to ground
forces in favor of strategic (nuclear) attack missions.
One consequence was that both Army and Marine
ground commanders were dissatisfied with USAF
CAS; in Korea, the X Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Ned
Almond, vociferously criticized USAF CAS in Korea,
compared to what he considered excellent support
from Marine CAS.11 Coordination and performance
81