Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 82

along with its broader missions, CAS provided to the
Army will suffer both qualitatively and quantitatively.
This situation will continue to worsen as the combined pressures of budget
cuts, escalating aircraft costs,
and the need to replace older
aircraft coincide. Aircraft
like the F-16 and F-15 are
rapidly approaching their
service life, forcing the service to bring the F-35 online,
regardless of its issues.9 These
facts place the Army in a
(Photo by Senior Airman Brett Clashman, U.S. Air Force)
poor position: requiring CAS
An A-10 Thunderbolt II from the U.S. Air Force Weapons School fires an AGM-65 Maverick
missile during a close air support training mission 23 September 2011 over the Nevada Test and
but lacking the organic caTraining Range, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. Budget cuts have threatened cancellation of the
pability while depending on
A-10 program.
another service to perform
wasted time, effort, and money attempting to achieve
the mission with aircraft designed for other purposes.
“do it all” miracles.
Aircraft cost must be measured against its capabilAdditionally, multirole, high-tech aircraft invariity and quantity produced. Particularly significant is
ably cost more than the aircraft they replace. Despite
the marginal cost of each aircraft over its predecessor.
projections of low-cost and savings due to technologWith only two exceptions, since the 1950s (A-10 and
ical advances, MRA/joint aircraft nearly always cost
F-16) marginal costs exceeded 200 percent. This is
more, do less, and result in fewer aircraft procured than an unpleas ant fact for MRA. Ironically, these cost
originally forecasted.7 The result is often “expensive and increases resulted in a smaller quantity of aircraft
delicate high-tech white elephants” that perform better
delivered and relatively poor performance when
only in test-like circumstances unlike and unrepresencompared to single-mission aircraft. Conversely,
8
tative of combat environments.
examples abound of aircraft designed for a specific
The F-35 represents the contemporary iteration of mission that ended-up performing many missions
this process. Critics charge the F-35 is overly expenwell. Consider the P-51 Mustang, which dominated
sive and cannot supplant A-10 CAS. Supporters conthe skies of Europe during World War II as a fighter,
tend that the F-35 is not a replacement for the A-10
fighter-bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft, only to
but can perform many missions including interdicemerge from storage during the Korean War—when
tion against high-end integrated air defense systems
USAF jets performed CAS poorly—as the F-51.10
and air-to-air combat, all equally well. What these
supporters fail to understand is that the combination
Obstacles to Army CAS
of these related missions degrades performance in
Current Army doctrine and organizational thinkall, regardless of how much impressive technology
ing preclude Army aviation from utilizing FW attack
designers cram into the aircraft. MRA may brief
aircraft. Additionally, the Army is, at least on paper,
well, but designing for multiple, nearly exclusive roles restricted from owning FW attack aircraft. However,
from the start inevitably results in poorly performthis has not precluded Army-operated FW armed uning aircraft. Furthermore, crews trained for multiple
manned aerial systems of nearly every type. These platmissions will inevitably do some better than others.
forms are launched and operated by Army units into
Given USAF historical and institutional preferences,
USAF controlled airspace without issue. Additionally,
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May-June 2016  MILITARY REVIEW