Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 81

ARMY AIRCRAFT

E

ffective close air support (CAS) depends on close
interdiction, in Air Force eyes, appear more profitable
cooperation between ground and air units, predthan close support..”4 USAF CAS ambivalence turns on
icated on mutual understanding and proximity
concerns regarding “the efficacy of using precious aircraft
as well as aviator training and aircraft characteristics.
sorties on dispersed targets close to, or intermingled with,
Despite recurring predictions of air power’s unilateral
friendly troops where the risk of fratricide is great.”5 This
dominance by many theorists beginning after World
view has permeated the USAF since the 1930s, when
War I, air-ground teams remain the most effective
the Air Corps Tactical School developed and fostered an
employment of military power. Technology, specifiinstitutional focus on bombing and interdiction—both of
cally precision weapons and stealth, may have altered
which necessitated an independent air force.
the conduct of air campaigns, but it has “not brought
This institutional focus was reinforced after World
about the revolution often
War II when the
proclaimed by many air
Air Force became
1
power advocates.”
a separate branch
Army doctrine reand solidified by
flects this in ADRP 3-0
the 1966 JohnsonUnified Land Operations.2
McConnell
Importantly, FM 3-90.6
Agreement,
Brigade Combat Team
which gave the
(BCT), which describes
Army control
employment of the
over tactical
Army’s primary warfhelicopters while
ighting units, describes
the Air Force reCAS as an Army requiretained all FW atment: “[BCTs] accomtack aircraft.6 As
plish their missions by
a result, the Army
integrating the actions
currently relies
(Image courtesy of Wikipedia Commons)
of maneuver battalions,
almost exclusively
A U.S. Marine Corps F4U-4B Corsair fighter-bomber receives a final check
field artillery, aviation,
on the USAF for
of its armament of bombs and 5-inch rockets prior to being catapulted
from
the
USS
Sicily
(CVE-118)
for
a
strike
on
enemy
forces
in
Korea
in
the
engineer, air and missile
FW CAS.
autumn of 1950.
defense, close air supHowever, uti3
port, and naval gunfire.”
lizing nonorganic means for critical functions violates
the unity of command, and results in CAS performed
The Case for Organic Army Close Air by aircraft primarily designed for other missions.
Support
This is by no means a recent phenomenon. Since the
While its organic helicopters are critical to operaadvent of the jet, the Air Force has been committed
tions, the Army needs CAS, meaning fixed-wing (FW)
to the concept of multirole aircraft (MRA). Focused
aircraft, to perform its primary role. Therefore, in the
on technology as an end, rather than a means, USAF
face of concerted efforts by the Air Force to scale back
programs have consistently prophesied that new techCAS to accommodate other budget priorities—because nologies will ameliorate any capability gaps. However,
CAS is vital to combined arms maneuver—the Army
MRAs exemplify the pejorative characteristics of
should hedge its requirements in this area by develAmerican military equipment design by demonstratoping its own organic CAS assets to augment the Air
ing a high cost-to-capability ratio and overall low
Force (USAF) CAS.
performance of key missions. They tend to be larger
While the Army views CAS as vital to its own comthan necessary, overly complex, and costly. In short,
bined arms operations, the USAF views it as a high-risk,
when you try to do everything well, you end up doing
low-payoff mission. This risk “often makes a dubious
many things poorly. The result is wasted time, effort,
trade-off for the damage inflicted, all of which makes
and money attempting to achieve “do it all” miracles.
MILITARY REVIEW  May-June 2016

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