Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 70

broadcast of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
from reaching its citizens.26
Imitative deception. Imitative deception involves
subtly altering an adversary’s propaganda in order
to discredit it or to use it as propaganda against the
adversary.27 During World War II, the Allies had developed a successful leaflet depicting life in an Allied
prisoner of war camp. Interrogations of German prisoners indicated a fear of being shipped to America,
where it would presumably take longer to get home
after the war, so the Allies modified the leaflet to say
that prisoners were no longer going to be shipped
to America. The Germans turned this around on
the Allies. They disseminated the leaflet to German
troops to prove that since “prisoners are no longer
sent to America,” they were instead being shipped to
Siberia. This was further developed into a successful
propaganda slogan Sieg oder Sibirien! (Victory over
Siberia!) for German troops.28
Conditioning. Conditioning eliminates potential
vulnerabilities in the target audience before exposure
to adversarial propaganda. The U.S. Army educated
soldiers during the Cold War on potential Warsaw
Pact propaganda themes and lines of persuasion
in order to condition them against Warsaw Pact
propaganda.
Forestalling. Forestalling anticipates adversary
propaganda and counters it by reaching the intended audience first with the message. Goebbels used
the technique of forestalling during his preparation
of the German populace for the defeat and surrender of German and Italian forces in North Africa in
1942. German media reported the historic struggle of
German forces in an attempt to beat Allied reporting
of the surrender.29
Minimization. The minimization technique acknowledges certain aspects of propaganda but minimizes its importance to the audience. An example is when
the Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines Flight
007. The Soviets initially denied the shooting, claiming
the aircraft was not a passenger liner but was on an
intelligence collection mission. The Soviets further attempted to minimize the incident, claiming the aircraft
strayed into Soviet airspace and had ignored Soviet
interceptor aircraft requests for identification.30

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These are just nine of the variety of techniques for
countering propaganda. The IO staff may use one or a
combination of these techniques based upon the situation. The decision of which technique to use is difficult
and requires extensive coordination, as well as resources
and assets. The IO staff considers the consequences,
especially unintended consequences, and the reaction
of the adversary. The IO staff must also make their organization aware that results require time, but the benefits
will be worth the investment.
Information operations will continue to play a
critical role in the success of an organization to conduct
operations. Our adversaries will use propaganda in conjunction with their operations in order to influence the
populace, to discredit the United States and its coalition
partners, and eventually to prevent us from accomplishing our goals. Timely use of effective counterpropaganda
measures provides the IO staff or organization the best
chance of controlling the discussion and the outcome.

Conclusion
This article serves as a starting point for th e discussion on inclusion of Army doctrinal counterpropaganda
methodology in joint doctrine publications. Germany’s
failure to conduct counterpropaganda activities in a
timely manner was a significant reason for its defeat in
World War I. Germany learned from its mistake and
was conducting an aggressive propaganda campaign
against the United States in the late 1930s through early
1940; its activities may have contributed to America’s
late entry into the war.
America’s success on the battlefield has marginalized the role of counterpropaganda in joint doctrine.
However, the counterpropaganda techniques outlined
in FM 3-05.301 need to be incorporated into joint
publications. Counterpropaganda measures will become
increasingly important in hybrid wars where the war of
ideas takes on greater importance.
Herbert Romerstein, former director of the U.S.
Information Agency’s Office to Counter Soviet
Disinformation and Active Measures, underscored the
importance of counterpropaganda when he remarked,
“Anti-American propaganda and disinformation are
powerful weapons in the hands of our rivals and enemies. Counterpropaganda is our defense.”31

May-June 2016  MILITARY REVIEW