Military Review English Edition May-June 2016 | Page 69

COUNTERPROPAGANDA

Additionally, audience interest in a topic will decrease questioning the credibility of the speaker or some
over time.
other aspect of the allegation. During the Civil War,
One of the most compelling reasons for utilizing
for example, the South countered Northern antislavcounterpropaganda meaery propaganda with
sures is that they provide
themes depicting the
a responding organization
deplorable working
the opportunity to regain
conditions in Northern
information dominance or
factories.22 These
change the topic to somethemes argued that
thing more favorable for
slaves were provided
its purposes. Conversely,
decent working conhowever, their use could
ditions and cradlegive legitimacy or credito-grave shelter and
bility to the source or the
subsistence, while wage
allegations in the propalaborers in northern
ganda. Counterpropaganda
factories were treated
measures may also allow
far worse.
the adversary to control
Diversion.
the discussion. Finally ,
Diversion seeks to
failure to respond fosters
avoid addressing a topic
the perception of hiding
through the introducsomething, or it may be
tion of a new topic.
perceived as a tacit admisAn example of this
(Image courtesy of Radio Free Europe)
sion of guilt.
occurred in late 1943
During the Cold War (1947–1991), the United States used a wide
It is important to keep
when the German
variety of informational tools and techniques to counter Soviet
communist propaganda. However, the strongest instrument for
in mind that trained,
propaganda ministry
countering propaganda proved to be simply telling the truth. To
experienced personnel
introduced rumors of
that end, the United States established several radio broadcast
are needed to execute
a German plan to esagencies, such as Radio Free Europe, that beamed truthful prosuccessful counterpropagramming into areas of the Soviet Union.
tablish a redoubt in the
ganda measures, and that
Alps as part of a campatience is required since the results of counterpropa- paign to divert attention away from increasing German
ganda efforts may not be known for some time.
battlefield defeats.23 The plan, titled “Alpine Fortress,”
consisted of Germany’s government and military forces
Counterpropaganda Techniques
retreating to prepared positions in the German Alps.
After weighing the pros and cons, the IO staff
Rumors of an Alpine Fortress became a major concern
should determine the proper counterpropaganda
for Allied military planners in early 1945.
response. FM 3-05.301 provides nine options with
Silence. Silence refers to not responding to the
examples in responding to adversarial propaganda: di- propaganda claims, other than to offer “unworthy of
rect refutation, indirect refutation, diversion, silence,
comment.”24 An interesting note is that World War II
restrictive measures, imitative deception, conditionGerman Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels would
ing, forestalling, and minimization. (These are only
sometimes refuse to deny or refute Allied claims consome of the variety of techniques used by military
cerning damage from air strikes in order to deceive
practitioners, political campaigners, and advertisers.
the Allies into believing they were achieving great
However, these nine are the most prominent.)
successes in the air war.25
Direct and indirect refutation. Direct refutation
Restrictive measures. Restrictive measures deny
is a point-for-point rebuttal of adversarial claims.21
access to the propaganda. Russia utilized jamming and
Indirect refutation seeks to change the topic by
other measures during the Cold War to prevent the
MILITARY REVIEW  May-June 2016

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